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ABSTRACT

Bittner, Amanda C. M.S., Purdue University, August 2014. Field to Flight: A Technoeconomic Analysis of Stover to Aviation Biofuels Supply Chain. Major Professor:
Wallace E. Tyner.

Greenhouse gas emissions have been a growing concern. The transportation
sector contributes to one-third of GHG emissions in the United States from fossil fuel
burning. The Renewable Fuel Standard set a requirement for 16 billion gallons (ethanol
equivalent) of cellulosic biofuels to be used in the market. Aviation biofuels can help to
meet both of these problems as well as improve U.S. energy security.
Investment in the biofuel industry carries a lot of risk. The biofuel industry is run
by the private sector, but can be incentivized by government. Cellulosic biofuels carry
even more risk than first generation biofuels, because conversion technology is more
expensive. As a result, incentives are needed to reduce the risk for private investors.
Government can implement policies to reduce the risk in investment in aviation biofuels.
The issue is choosing which policy will provide the most reduction in risk, while
providing a lowest cost to the government.
This analysis focuses on aviation biofuel production using fast pyrolysis from
corn stover. Cost benefit analysis is used to calculate the net present value, internal rate
of return, and benefit-cost ratio for a plant. We look at deterministic and stochastic cases.
For the stochastic cases, this study uses @Risk, a Palisades Corporation software to
determine the risk of investment in aviation biofuels. Uncertainty is added to fuel price
and four technical variables: capital cost, final fuel yield, hydrogen cost, and feedstock
cost. The fuel price can be steady or increasing at DOE projections.

xiii
We look at the impact of three policies: reverse auction, competitive capital subsidy, and
carbon tax. For the reverse auction and capital subsidy, we used contract lengths of 5, 10,
and 15 years to see the impact a longer contract could have on probability of loss.
All three policies reduced risk in investment of aviation biofuels. A reverse
auction reduced risk of investment the most. As the contract length increased, the
probability of loss and coefficient of variation in net present value were reduced
substantially. When fuel price increased stochastically and a contract length of 15 years
was used, probability of loss was reduced to 9.9 percent.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Importance of Aviation Biofuels

Biofuels came into existence to reduce oil imports, to reduce GHG emissions, and
to increase farm income (Tyner 2008). A worldwide push for cleaner air to protect the
environment and high oil prices led the way for increased awareness and production. The
United States Environmental Protection Agency reports that the transportation sector is
responsible for 32 percent of the total CO2 emissions from combustion of fossil fuels. In
2012, it contributed to 27 percent of total US GHG emissions (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency). As a result, there has been a focus on producing biofuels for that
sector as a way to reduce GHG emissions.
The transportation sector has many fuel sources. Figure 1.1 shows the energy
consumption by fuel of the transportation sector. In 2011, jet fuel made up about 11
percent of the transportation sector’s energy consumption. The U.S. Energy Information
Administration predicts that by 2040, it will increase to 13 percent.
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Figure 1.1 Transportation Energy Consumption by Fuel, 1990-2040 (quadrillion Btu)
(source: (2013a))

The U.S. consumes over 20 billion gallons of aviation fuel each year. With a
blending ratio of aviation biofuel to petroleum fuel of 50%, the potential for aviation
biofuels is over 10 billion gallons. The U.S. Energy Information Administration expects

consumption to grow each year (2013a). Currently, aviation is responsible for 2% of the
world’s manmade carbon dioxide emissions (2013b). This percentage is expected to
grow as demand for air services increases (2013b).
Growth in aviation biofuels can have positive effects. Aviation biofuels allow for
diversity in fuel supply as well as reduction in global carbon emissions. As a part of
drop-in cellulosic biofuels, they have the potential to create jobs, generate economic

growth, and drive innovation for clean technology (2013b). A sustainable future for
aviation as well as improving U.S. energy security are also potential positive effects.

Biofuels used in vehicles have been around for many years, and became more
pertinent to the public in 2007 with the implementation of the Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS) mandate. More recently, aviation biofuels have come to the forefront. There are
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other alternatives for ground transport such as ethanol, compressed natural gas and
electric vehicles, but the only renewable alternative for aviation is biofuels (Tyner 2012).

1.1.1

Renewable Fuel Standards

The Renewable Fuel Standard consists of four categories: biodiesel, cellulosic
advanced, other advanced, and conventional biofuels. Corn ethanol can only contribute
to the conventional biofuels category. However, the RFS is a nested structure, so
biodiesel, cellulosic advanced, and other advanced can contribute to the overall mandate
as well as for their own category.
There are two main different types of biofuels, first-generation and secondgeneration. First-generation biofuels in the U.S. are mostly corn ethanol and oilseed and
waste product biodiesel. Biodiesel and ethanol are not suitable for use in commercial
aircraft. Aircraft engines do not use diesel, and ethanol energy density is too low for
aviation. However, second-generation ‘drop-in’ biofuels are a good alternative to fossil
fuels. Second-generation biofuels are mainly cellulosic biofuels. They require more
advanced technology to extract the fuel compared to first-generation biofuels, and as a
result cost more to produce.
Drop-in cellulosic biofuels are necessary to meet the requirements of the
Renewable Fuel Standard. Ethanol has hit its blend wall at ten percent of gasoline
consumption. Therefore, it is unlikely that much ethanol will be produced from
cellulosic feedstocks. As a result, there is a need for other renewable products such as
drop-in cellulosic biofuels to fulfill the cellulosic biofuels requirement.
Cellulosic biofuels volumes are expected to grow significantly, but will still fall
short of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 targets. Aviation biofuels fit
into cellulosic drop-in fuels, which are fuels that are direct replacements for petroleumbased gasoline or distillate fuels (Administration 2013). Figure 1.2 shows the renewable
fuel standard mandated by the 2007 EISA. The EISA of 2007, set a target level of 500
million gallons of cellulosic biofuels by 2012, 1 billion gallons by 2013, and 16 billion
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gallons by 2022 (Administration 2013), all ethanol equivalent. Overall, they set an RFS
target of 35 billion gallons of ethanol-equivalent biofuels and 1 billion gallons of
biomass-based diesel in 2022 (2013a). The U.S. Energy Information Administration

predicts domestic consumption of drop-in cellulosic biofuels to grow from 0.3 billion
gallons in 2011 to 9.0 billion gallons in 2040 (2013a). This growth is a result of rising oil
prices and projected decreased production costs for biofuel technologies.

Figure 1.2 Renewable Fuel Volume Consumption Mandated by 2007 EISA, 2008-2022
(source: (National Research Council 2011))

1.2

Biofuel Industry

There are several different cellulosic biofuel pathways. Thermochemical
pyrolysis, thermochemical gasification, biochemical direct fermentation, and biochemical
fermentation with catalytic upgrading can be used (Voegele 2013). Brown et al.
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concluded that fast pyrolysis with hydroprocessing is the most economically feasible
(Brown et al. 2013b). This research examines the fast pyrolysis of corn stover to bio-oil.
Cellulosic feedstocks can come from dedicated energy crops such as miscanthus
and switchgrass or from crop residues. First-generation biofuels, such as ethanol, are
reliant upon crop sources which have an impact on food prices and induce land use
change. Second generation biofuel feedstocks have less competition with food. However,
dedicated energy crops like switchgrass do require land and thus can cause induced land
use change. Dedicated crops tend to be more expensive than crop residues. According to
the National Academy of Sciences report, alfalfa, switchgrass, and miscanthus all have
willingness to accept prices exceeding corn stover. Corn stover’s willingness to accept
price is $92, which is less than alfalfa at $118, switchgrass in the Midwest at $133, and
miscanthus in the Midwest at $115 (National Research Council 2011). For these reasons,
this analysis is focused on the use of corn stover. Stover is a crop residue as opposed to a
dedicated crop, and has little impact on food prices and land use change (Fiegel 2012).
As a result, corn stover may be a viable source for use in producing renewable energy.

1.2.1

Policies to Stimulate Biofuels

The biofuel industry faces five major areas of uncertainty impeding investment:
crude oil price, feedstock availability and cost, conversion technology yields and costs,
environmental impacts, and government policy (Tyner 2012). Cellulosic biofuels require
more expensive conversion technology, which results in higher costs. Higher costs
means there is higher risk for private investors, so incentives may be needed to entice
private investors to invest.
The biofuel industry can be incentivized by government, but is owned and
operated by the private sector. There are a wide array of possible policies that could be
used to stimulate biofuels production. In this research, we will focus on three policies,
which differ in the extent to which they help reduce uncertainty for private sector
investors. These are a reverse auction, competitive capital subsidy, and carbon tax.
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One policy option which would help navigate uncertainties in investment is the
reverse auction (Tyner 2012). In a reverse auction a prospective purchaser would request
bids for a contract to supply aviation biofuels. The low bid (thus the name reverse
auction) wins the bid.
A competitive capital subsidy is when potential plant builders compete for the
subsidy from the government. The subsidy provides assistance to the private investor for
a stipulated plant size and product type. The private investor that bids the lowest level
for the subsidy wins the contract. A carbon tax is a tax on the CO2 emissions. The
difference in CO2 emissions from fossil jet fuel and corn stover jet fuel is calculated. A
tax in dollars per gallon is added to each year. All three policies reduce risk, but to what
extent and what cost to the government?

1.3

Objectives

Aviation biofuels currently are expected to cost more than fossil jet fuels, at least
in the near term. The objective of this research is to conduct a techno-economic analysis
of stover to aviation biofuels pathway, and to determine the risk reduction/cost tradeoffs
that allow the government to choose the policy most appealing to private sector investors
and at a lowest government cost. The first step is to develop an economic model that
details the costs for production of corn stover, transport to a plant, and conversion to
aviation biofuel. Then, that model is used to estimate the uncertainty in reverse auction,
competitive capital subsidy, and carbon tax. Comparing the outcomes for each policy in
the context of expected plant economics will provide the government with a better
understanding of the implications of the policies.
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1.4

Organization

Chapter 2 provides a literature review of corn stover, fast pyrolysis, life-cycle
analysis, policy options for implementation, as well as data drawn from relevant literature.
Chapter 3 covers methods used in this analysis. To assess the processing model, data
provided by Honeywell UOP will be used to develop a base case. An economic model
will determine base case results, which will then be used to conduct a financial and
uncertainty analysis on possible policy alternatives. The policy analysis will include a
financial analysis.
Using the data and methods from Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 presents the results
of the analysis. Both a deterministic and a stochastic model will be used to present base
case results and financial analysis results. The stochastic model will be used for the
policy comparison cases. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the key conclusions reached from
the study as well as limitations and suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review examines the corn stover to aviation biofuels pathway. It
covers the issues related to corn stover harvest, storage, and transport to a processing
plant. Concerns and costs related to soil nutrients and nutrient replacement, possible
environmental impacts of stover removal are included. Pre-processing of stover for use
in fast pyrolysis, as well as the process of fast pyrolysis and the storage of bio-oil will be
described. Environmental impacts of aviation biofuel production will be assessed
through life-cycle analysis. Possible policies for aviation biofuel implementation into the
market will be explored.

2.1

Corn Stover

2.1.1 Benefits of Using Corn Stover for Aviation Biofuels
Using corn stover for aviation biofuels can help meet the target level of 16 billion
gallons ethanol equivalent of cellulosic biofuels mandated by the RFS for 2022.
Agricultural residues could account for around one-third of the total (Tyner 2010a). Corn
stover has advantages over other biomass feedstocks. In comparison to switchgrass,
hybrid poplar, and small-grain straw, corn stover yield is quite high. It also has the
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benefit of having corn as a high value co-product. (Shinners et al. 2007). There is an
abundance of corn stover available for harvest throughout the United States. EPA
estimates that 82 million dry tons of corn stover could be harvested in the Midwest
alone in 2022 (National Research Council 2011).
Corn stover is a relatively inexpensive feedstock option. As stated in the
introduction, corn stover has an estimated cost less than alfalfa, switchgrass, and
miscanthus. Corn stover consists of the above ground, non-grain part of the corn
plant (Vadas and Digman 2013). It is the part of the corn plant remaining in the field
after harvesting the grain (2013b). Therefore, the only costs associated with corn
stover are nutrient replacement, harvesting, storage, and transportation (Tyner 2010a).
Corn stover is a lignocellulosic feedstock. Lignocellulosic feedstocks are composed
of three parts: cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin. Thermochemical conversion
processes utilize all parts of the feedstock, including lignin (Tyner 2010a).
Corn stover supports rather than competes with human food production
(MASBI). As an agricultural residue, corn stover does not require additional land, so
therefore does not compete with food.

2.1.2 Harvest Process
Harvesting stover should be done without degrading soil, water, or air
resources. Crop residues protect land from wind and water erosion, as well as supply
an input of carbon and replenish plant nutrients (Karlen et al. 2011). Therefore, the
removal of them must be done sustainably. Karlen et al. found that removal rates of
50% and 90% lead to gradual decline in total organic carbon (Karlen et al. 2011).
The amount of stover that can be removed sustainably depends upon yield, tillage
practice, and crop rotation (Zinkand 2012). A common rule of thumb can be used
when determining the potential of corn stover: the mass of available stover will be
about equal to the mass of grain harvested (Shinners and Binversie 2007). BlancoCanqui found that only 25% of stover is available for removal (Blanco-Canqui and
Lal 2009). Stover moisture averages about double the moisture of the grain. There
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are two portions of the corn stalk, upper and lower, in which nutrient concentrations
differ. “The upper portion of the corn stalk provides a higher quality feedstock for
both thermochemical and fermentation platforms (Johnson et al. 2010).” Harvesting
stover at a height of about 40 cm would be best (Hoskinson et al. 2007) from the
composition perspective.
Stover can be harvested dry or wet. Problems exist with both harvest methods.
Field drying rate, harvest window, weather, and harvest efficiency must all be taken
into consideration when choosing a harvest process (Vadas and Digman 2013).
Generally, stover is harvested dry, which is at 20-25% moisture. This requires cutting
and shredding, windrowing, baling, and hauling of bales. The harvesting efficiency is
only about 30% due to inefficiencies from the shredder and baler (Shinners et al.
2007). Dry stover can also contain large quantities of foreign matter collected by the
baler (Caldecott). Wet stover harvest (>45% moisture) uses a combine followed by a
shredder. A forage harvester then gathers the stover. Harvesting wet stover,
eliminates the drying period between grain and stover harvest and increases the
harvest window (Shinners and Binversie 2007). The harvesting efficiency is greater
for wet stover compared to dry stover due to less time for decomposition to occur.
Timing of harvest and the harvest window are very important. There is only a
40-day window to collect residue (Caldecott). Delayed collection can diminish the
quantity of stover that remains to be collected (Pordesimo et al. 2005). Action must
be taken quickly to harvest it. However, for dry stover harvest, the time after grain
harvest for stover to reach ideal moisture can take a few days to weeks (Shinners et al.
2007). This leaves time for weather to heavily influence the quality of the stover. As
time between grain and stover harvest increases, yield and harvesting efficiency
decrease (Shinners et al. 2007).
A possible solution to harvest problems is the Cornrower system. It is an
attachment that fits on a New Holland 99C corn head. Dirt accumulation is nearly
nonexistent, and labor and fuel are eliminated to windrow stover. Fuel use and labor
costs are reduced. Smaller particles are created, which allow bales to be denser.
Increased density results in reduction in time, fuel, and storage space with hauling
and storing stover (Straeter 2011, Zinkand 2012).
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2.1.3 Corn Stover Storage
Stover can be stored in many different ways and for various periods of time.
It can be stored wet or dry. For wet storage, it is ensiled. For dry storage, it can be
baled into round or square bales. There is also the option to store bales outdoors or
indoors. Bales have three preparation methods: twine, net wrap, or plastic wrap. Net
wrap is the cheapest option (Tyner 2010a). Vadas et al. determined that outdoor,
wrapped bales was the least-cost storage option due to zero cost for structures or
stone pads (Vadas and Digman 2013). Thompson and Tyner concluded that netwrapped bales stored outside on a stone bed under a tarp was the best option
(Thompson and Tyner 2014).
Dry matter loss occurs during storage. The length of time stover is in storage
and the type of baling chosen affect the amount of dry matter loss (Brechbill, Tyner,
and Ileleji 2011). Moisture level affects the storage success rate. At a certain level of
moisture, there is no storage structure that can successfully conserve stover. As the
moisture level increases, more problems arise, and successful conservation of stover
decreases or becomes unattainable. Successful stover conservation has low DM
losses, minimal compositional changes, and low mold growth. Shinners found that
only stover stored in covered aerobic piles when stover moisture was less than 25% or
stover stored anaerobically met the criteria (Shinners et al. 2010).

2.1.4 Transportation to Plant
Transportation from the farm to the plant can happen four ways: by road, by
railway, by waterway, or by pipelines. Trucks have been proven to be the most
realistic form of transportation. Road transportation has flexibility, low fixed costs,
and higher variable costs. It is the preferred transportation. A 53-foot flatbed trailer
can haul about 26 large round bales (Fiegel 2012).
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2.1.5 Concerns of Stover Harvest
2.1.5.1 Soil Nutrient Loss
Removal of stover can have adverse effects on the soil depending on the
removal rate. Studies have found both positives and negatives associated with stover
removal. For no-till continuous corn, stover removal may be beneficial. Removing
stover can lead to faster spring soil warm-up. Karlen et al. found that for producers
with high yields, where residue management may be a problem, moderate stover
harvest is beneficial. It may decrease fuel use and save energy by reducing tillage
(Karlen et al. 2011). Harvesting corn stover may also increase grain yield (Karlen et
al. 2014). Karlen et al. 2014 found that in about 50% of the sites tested, removing
stover at moderate and high rates increased the grain yield. Johnson et al. 2014 found
that 6 Mg residue ha-1 yr-1 rate was needed to sustain SOC levels (Johnson et al.
2014). However, most studies have found that stover removal has negative impacts
on the soil. Stover removal results in a decrease in nutrients. The three main
nutrients impacted from stover removal are nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and
potassium (K), as well as micronutrients. Setiyono et al. found for every 1000kg of
stover removed per hectare, 8.11 N g/kg, 0.52 P g/kg, and 21.82 K g/kg was removed
(Setiyono et al. 2010). Johnson et al. found that as the cutting height of stover is
lowered, the amount of C removed from the field increases (Johnson et al. 2010).
Nutrients that are lost due to stover removal may need to be replaced. There
is ongoing debate over how much nutrients, if any, need to be replaced. Jeffrey
Volenec, an Agronomy Professor at Purdue University believes that mass balance
suggests you would need to replace the nutrients, which are lost (Volenec 2013).
Nutrient replacement is vital to obtaining good crop yields. In particular,
nitrogen replacement is important since it is a large driver of yield. As a result, the
assumption is generally made that little or no nitrogen carries over from year-to-year
due to its influence on yields (Volenec 2013). Therefore, farmers generally apply a
full application of nitrogen to ensure good yields. However, a full application is not
always necessary depending on the crop rotation used.
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The type of crop rotation used has an impact on nutrient replacement.
Volenec suggests that replacement rates vary depending on the crop grown in the
field the previous year (Volenec 2013). The two main crop rotations used are corncorn and corn-soybean. For a corn-corn rotation, corn planted the previous year does
not transfer a sufficient amount of nitrogen back into the soil for a good yielding corn
crop this year. As a result, a full application of nitrogen each year is necessary. This
is not the case for a corn-soybean rotation. Depending on the field conditions, only a
partial application of nitrogen may be necessary to ensure good corn yields.
Therefore, farmers may apply less nitrogen (Volenec 2013). Fiegel calculated the
total nutrient replacement of corn stover removed excluding nitrogen replacement for
both crop rotations per ton to be $12.73 (Fiegel 2012). However, the total nutrient
replacement cost of corn stover removed for a continuous corn rotation may be higher
due to nitrogen application. Therefore, the total nutrient replacement cost of corn
stover for a continuous corn rotation may be closer to that calculated by Thompson
and Tyner, which includes nitrogen, at $19.07 (Thompson and Tyner 2014).
There are solutions to lessening effects of stover removal on the soil. Two
possible solutions are decreasing tillage and adding cover crops. By adding cover
crops, the soil organic carbon is increased (Pratt 2012). Bonner et al. (2014) found
that using cover crops and no-till management can increase the sustainable stover
supply. By using no-till, winter cover crops, and vegetative barriers, more stover can
be harvested without exceeding soil erosion values or depleting SOC ((Bonner et al.
2014)). As a result of these practices, nutrient cycling, TOC content, and productivity
can be improved (Karlen et al. 2011).
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2.1.5.2 Transportation
Transportation of stover from the farm to the plant is costly. One cause of
inefficiency is low bale density (Karlen et al. 2011). The issue is that although the
truck beds reach volume capacity, they do not reach mass capacity. The law states
that the maximum gross weight of the truck and biomass can be 36,000 kg (Miao et al.
2012). However, current gross weight does not come close to reaching that
maximum. Densification and size reduction of stover can be crucial to improving
delivery efficiency (Miao et al. 2012). Increasing bale density will result in fewer
trips having to be made to the plant and will reduce the transportation cost of stover.
Road transportation must also take into consideration infrastructure limitations, traffic
congestion, and environmental impacts. Multiple trips from the farm to the plant can
cause wear and tear on the roads. The best indicator of road infrastructure impact is
vehicle trip miles for each plant (Tyner 2010b). Tyner and Rismiller conclude that a
50 million gallon per year cellulosic plant will have 55,182 truckloads of biomass
delivered each year.

2.1.6 Total Cost of Stover
Fiegel conducted a study in which she calculated the total cost of stover for a
corn-soybean rotation and a corn-corn rotation. The total cost of stover was broken
down into harvest, storage, loading and unloading, and transportation. Harvest cost
accounted for fuel, labor, equipment, net wrap, and nutrient replacement costs. The
storage cost was calculated assuming stover was stored outside on a rock bed under a
tarp for up to a year. Loading and unloading focused on time it took to put the bales
on the truck. Transportation occurred from the farm to the plant. All costs were the
same except for total harvest cost as shown below in Table 2.1. The harvest cost for a
corn-corn rotation results in needing one less tillage pass which achieves a cost
reduction of $13.28 per ton (Fiegel 2012). Farm gate cost is also included which
accounts for total harvest cost and storage cost.
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Table 2.1 Costs found by Fiegel ($/ton at 15% moisture) (source: (Fiegel 2012))

Description
Harvest Cost
Fuel Cost
Labor Cost
Equipment Cost
Net Wrap Cost
Nutrient Replacement Cost
Total Harvest Cost
Storage Cost
Farm Gate Cost
Loading and Unloading Cost
Transport Cost
Total Cost

Corn-Soybean Rotation Corn-Corn Rotation
$3.59
$3.08
$6.54
$5.60
$12.73
$31.54
$16.10
$47.64
$6.22
$20.18
$74.03

2.2

$3.59
$3.08
$6.54
$5.60
$12.73
$18.25($31.54-$13.28)
$16.10
$34.35
$6.22
$20.18
$60.75

Fast Pyrolysis

Four processes are available for converting biomass to energy forms: thermal,
biological, mechanical, and physical. Thermal conversion gives multiple products in
short reaction times with a quality product. There are three main thermal processes as
shown below in Figure 2.1 (pyrolysis, Fisher Tropsch gasification, and combustion).
However, pyrolysis appears to be quite attractive due to its versatility, improved
efficiency, and environmental acceptability (Bridgwater 2012).
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Figure 2.1 Products from Thermal Biomass Conversion and Available Markets
(source: (Bridgwater 2012))

There are four types of pyrolysis: fast, intermediate, slow, and gasification,
which can produce liquid, char, and gas (Jones 2009). Each mode of pyrolysis is
capable of producing different yields of the three products. The process that appears
to be most attractive is fast pyrolysis (Brown et al. 2013b). It is preferred to the other
options because it produces a higher yield of liquid (Jones 2009). Production of
liquid is advantageous, because it allows for easier storage and transport compared to
char and gas. Fast pyrolysis for production of liquids has developed considerably
since its first introduction in the 1970s. Over the years, it has become a potentially
viable route to renewable liquid fuels (Bridgwater 2000).
Pyrolysis is also preferred in comparison to other conversion processes due to
its lower cost. Anex et al. (2010) compared the costs of three conversion platforms:
pyrolysis, gasification, and biochemical. The conversion technologies were chosen
based on commercial feasibility in the near future, facility feasibility using current
agricultural feedstocks, and final product compatibility with current fuel
infrastructure. The product range for all three conversion processes was $2.00-$5.50
per gallon of gasoline equivalent. Pyrolysis had the lowest product range of $2.00$3.00/gge. Biochemical had the highest with a product value range of $5.00-
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$5.50/gge. Overall, pyrolysis had the lowest product value and total capital
investment (Anex et al. 2010).

2.2.1

Pre-processing

Before biomass can be processed into bio-oil, there are three pretreatment
steps that must be taken to ensure an efficient process. The first step is removal of
ash content present in the biomass. As discussed in the previous section of the
literature review, corn stover harvest picks up a certain amount of ash. The presence
of ash in stover can cause fouling and plugging of equipment (Wright et al. 2010).
Minerals cause thermal decomposition reactions that are necessary to produce quality
bio-oil (Wright et al. 2010). Washing stover with water can reduce the alkali content
present to ensure a quality bio-oil is produced. Washing stover before chopping and
grinding it minimizes the moisture that can be absorbed by the product (Aden 2002).
Therefore, washing should be done first in the pretreatment steps.
The second step necessary for an efficient process and better yields is drying.
The moisture content of delivered stover varies for different biomasses, harvest
conditions, and storage. In order for biorefineries to want to purchase corn stover, it
must contain <36% moisture (Thompson 2011). More moisture in the feed leads to
lower process yields. For a good pyrolysis yield, the recommended moisture is less
than 7% (Wright et al. 2010). As a result, washing of the stover must be followed by
drying. Drying of stover is essential to obtaining good yields. The maximum optimal
moisture content of the feed at the pyrolyzer is 10% (Palma 2011). Any moisture that
is present in the feedstock when it begins pyrolysis will vaporize, but will recondense with the bio-oil product. Even if the feedstock contained zero percent
moisture, the bio-oil would still contain 12-15 wt% water (Ringer 2006). Therefore,
it is important that moisture content is low. This means that stover drying will be
part of the conversion process (Brown et al. 2013b).
Chopping and grinding of the feedstock is an important part of pretreatment.
The particle size is reduced to 10 mm and then 3 mm. By shrinking the size of the
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particle, the risk of decreasing yields and increasing heat requirements are reduced
(Wright et al. 2010). Other studies found that the biomass must be ground to a size
less than 3 mm for the optimum temperature to be reached during pyrolysis
(Bridgwater 2012). Since pyrolysis occurs with two second residence times, the
particle must be heated thoroughly in a short time. Reducing the size of the particle
allows for more uniform heating. It also helps with the physical transition from
pyrolysis when char develops at the surface of the particle. Char slows down the
transfer of heat throughout the entire particle, so smaller particles are better (Ringer
2006).

2.2.2

Process Description

Once the feedstock is dried, chopped, and ground, it is then ready for
pyrolysis. Pyrolysis converts biomass into bioenergy through heat in the absence of
oxygen (Palma 2011). It is a thermal process that is characterized by temperatures
around 500oC, rapid heat transfer, and low residence times (Wright et al. 2010). A
temperature of 500oC maximizes the yield, while a residence time of less than 2
seconds minimizes secondary reactions. The yield of liquid that results is based on
biomass type, temperature, hot vapor residence time, char separation, and biomass
ash content (Bridgwater 2012).
The reactor is the main part of pyrolysis. There are many different reactors
available for use. Some reactors available are bubbling fluidized bed pyrolyzers,
circulating fluidized bed pyrolyzers, rotating plate pyrolysis, rotating cone pyrolysis,
ablative pyrolysis, and hydropyrolysis (Bridgwater 2012, Sadaka). The most popular
reactors are the fluid beds and circulating fluid beds due to their simple construction
and operation (Bridgwater 2012). Most of the studies examine the bubbling fluidized
bed pyrolyzer in Figure 2.2. They are desirable due to their good temperature control
and efficient heat transfer (Bridgwater 2012). They also have large heat storage
capacity. The small particle enters a sand medium in a zero-oxygen environment.
While there, it is quickly heated and decomposes into char, gas, vapors and aerosols
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(Sadaka). The char is separated in cyclones with it making up about 15 wt% of the
product. Some of the char is used to provide heat during combustion, while the rest is
exported (Bridgwater 2012). A study by Lee et al. found that biochar from pyrolysis
is suitable for improvement of soil and as a carbon sequestration agent (Lee 2010).
The gas, vapors, and aerosols get cooled in the quench cooler. This must occur
quickly or the compounds will further crack (Ringer 2006). Then the condensed biooil is collected and stored. The non-condensable gas goes through the electrostatic
precipitator where it is recycled or used as fuel for heat (Sadaka).

Figure 2.2 Bubbling Fluid Bed Reactor with Electrostatic Precipitator
(source: (Bridgwater 2012))

2.2.3

Storage of Bio-oil

Bio-oil is made up of oxygenated hydrocarbons and water (Bridgwater 2012).
It generally contains anywhere from 12 to about 25% water (Ringer 2006) (Jones
2009). It is the liquid condensate of the vapors after they leave the quench cooler. It
is dark-brown and has a high density and viscosity. Bio-oil has a high oxygen content,
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which results in a lower heating value. It is also acidic, making it unstable and
corrosive (Sadaka). Once collected, bio-oil is stored. The storage capacity is large
enough to store up to four weeks of liquid product. The reason for storage is in case
there is delay in getting the product to market (Bridgwater 2012).
Although bio-oil has many benefits, there are problems associated with the
long-term storage of it. Over time, bio-oil can increase in viscosity (Sadaka). The
reason this occurs is because the production of bio-oils from fast pyrolysis is a
thermodynamically non-equilibrium process (Ringer 2006). Oxygenated compounds
in the bio-oil attempt to achieve equilibrium through chemical reactions in storage.
The chemical reactions result in a higher viscosity.

2.2.4

Upgrading of Bio-oil

Bio-oil is corrosive and highly oxygenated which make it difficult to store,
transport, and refine (Brown et al. 2013b). Therefore, upgrading of bio-oil is
necessary to stabilize it. It can be upgraded physically, chemically, or catalytically.
Physical upgrading uses filtration and a solvent. Filtration produces a higher quality
bio-oil, and a solvent reduces the viscosity (Bridgwater 2012). Catalytic upgrading
requires full deoxygenation of bio-oil. One form of catalytic upgrading is
hydroprocessing shown in Figure 2.3. Hydroprocessing involves hydrotreating and
hydrocracking. Hydrotreating removes the sulfur and nitrogen, which reduce biooil’s viscosity and corrosiveness (Brown et al. 2013a). Hydrocracking follows
hydrotreating, and reacts with the hydrotreated bio-oil. The goal of hydrocracking is
to completely deoxygenate the bio-oil, so it can be blended with gasoline and diesel
fuels (Brown et al. 2013b).
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Figure 2.3 Fast Pyrolysis and Hydroprocessing System (source: (Brown et al. 2013a))

Upgrading requires a certain amount of hydrogen. Plants can either choose to
produce it or purchase it. Producing hydrogen diverts a portion of the plant’s bio-oil
produced to generate hydrogen. Wright et al. (2010) examined the production of
naptha and diesel range stock fuel from fast pyrolysis of corn stover and upgrading of
the bio-oil. The study explored the cost of upgrading bio-oil to transportation fuel.

Naptha and diesel range products can be produced at a competitive cost of $3.09$2.11/gal (Wright et al. 2010). For hydrogen production, the fuel product value
estimate was $3.09 per gallon of gasoline equivalent. For the hydrogen purchasing

scenario, the fuel product value estimate was $2.11 per gallon of gasoline equivalent.
Results showed that fuel could be prod
produced
uced cheaper by hydrogen purchasing than
hydrogen production. Brown et al. (2013b) updated the study. Three changes were
employed: construction of a boiler and turbogenerator unit, more expensive
hydroprocessing unit, and a lower bio-oil yield. This resulted in a change in the
minimum fuel selling price to $2.57/gal as shown below in Table 2.3 (Brown et al.
2013b). Therefore, fast pyrolysis and hydroprocessing are still estimated to be

competitive with petroleum-based transportation fuels, but not as competitive as the
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in the previous study. Table 2.2 shows the assumptions that Brown used to find the
minimum fuel selling price.

Table 2.2 Assumptions Brown used in his studies (Source: (Brown et al. 2013b))
Assumptions
Facility size (MTPD)
Facility fuel output (MGY)
Equity (%)
Bond yield (%)
TPI (million $)
Hydrogen Source
Hydrogen cost ($/kg)
Electricity price ($/kWh)
IRR (%)
Feedstock Cost ($/MT)

2010 ISU Study
2000
58.2
100
N/A
200
Merchant
1.33
0.054
10
83

2013 Study
2000
57.4
50
7.5
429
Merchant
1.33
0.054
10
83

Table 2.3 Transportation fuel MFSPs from Brown (Source: (Brown et al. 2013b))
Analysis
2010 ISU Study 2013 Study
2.57
Transportation fuel MFSP ($/gal) 2.11

2.2.5

Envergent Technologies

Envergent technologies was founded in October 2008. It is a joint venture by
UOP, a Honeywell Company, and Ensyn. UOP is a leading process technology
licensor. Ensyn has experience with commercial fast pyrolysis, and are the
developers of rapid thermal processing (RTP). Together, the two companies provide
pyrolysis oil technology for fuel oil substitution (Streff 2009). The technology used
is rapid thermal processing (RTP).
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2.2.5.1 Rapid Thermal Processing
Rapid thermal processing is a fast thermal conversion process using fast
pyrolysis (Envergent Technology 2013). It is sustainable, cost-effective, and almost
carbon-neutral. In comparison to combustion, it delivers more useable energy, and
the energy has the ability to be stored on site. In comparison to gasification, it
requires lower temperatures and pressure, making it less energy intensive. The
process can handle a variety of feedstocks for conversion into char, gas, and bio-oil
(Envergent Technology 2010).

2.2.5.1.1 Pyrolysis
The pyrolysis process used for rapid thermal processing has similarities and
differences to the generic pyrolysis described above. As stated previously, the
process rapidly heats biomass in the absence of oxygen. As pictured in Figure 2.4
below, the dried small biomass particles make contact with the circulating hot sand in
the reactor (Envergent Technology 2013). The process can be done at temperatures
between 400 and 950oC (Goyal, Seal, and Saxena 2008). For generic pyrolysis, yield
is maximized at 500oC, whereas for RTP pyrolysis, the temperature which optimizes
liquid yield is less than 600oC (Graham 1994). Similar to the generic pyrolysis,
pyrolytic vapor is rapidly quenched to produce liquid fuel, which is then preserved
through cooling. The liquid yield varies from 55-80% depending on the biomass
feedstock used (Envergent Technology 2010).
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Figure 2.4 Rapid Thermal Processing Flow Diagram (source: (Streff 2009))

Rapid thermal processing green fuel is expected to reduce carbon emissions
up to 90%. The price of RTP green fuel is largely dependent on the cost of the
biomass feedstock. However, at a cost of $110 per tonne of biomass, RTP green fuel
is still expected to be cost competitive with heavy fuel oil (Envergent Technology
2013).

2.2.5.1.2 Hydrotreating

Similar to hydroprocessing described previously, aafter
fter RTP green fuel is
produced, it is upgraded to transportation fuel by hydrotreating
hydrotreating.. In order to upgrade
RTP green fuels, oxygen molecules must be removed and acidity and viscosity must
be reduced (Streff 2009). The RTP green fuel goes through a two stage

hydrodeoxygenation. The resulting liquid is a pH neutral fuel (Streff 2012).
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2.3

Life-Cycle Analysis

Life-cycle analysis is key to understanding and improving biofuel production.
It assesses the environmental impacts of a product from beginning to end. For the
case of aviation biofuels, it estimates the benefits of using aviation biofuels to reduce
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions relative to conventional jet fuel (CJF) (Han et al.
2013). With air traffic expected to grow in the future, so will GHG emissions and the
importance of life-cycle analysis.
A well-to-wake analysis (WTWa) accounts for energy and emissions from all
stages in development and use of an aviation fuel. This includes feedstock recovery
and transportation, fuel production and transportation, and fuel consumption during
aircraft operation (Han et al. 2013). Han et al. uses the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated
Emissions, and Energy use in Transportation (GREET) model to examine the well-towake analysis. By using GREET, WTWa results can be estimated for energy use and
GHG emissions for various types and classes of aircraft (Elgowainy et al. 2012).

2.3.1

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

There is variability in life-cycle analysis GHG emissions. Feedstock source,
fuel conversion technology, allocation or displacement credit methodology applied
co-products, and different alternative bio-jet pathways affect the reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions (Elgowainy et al. 2012).
Feedstock source can have a large impact on reduction of life-cycle GHG
emissions. Different crop residues and dedicated energy crops have various effects
on land use change and GHG emissions. Estimating land use change is difficult,
however an important part of life-cycle analysis. There are two types of land use
change, direct and indirect. Much of the previous literature discusses land use change
in terms of direct and indirect land use change. However, the definitions of these
terms have never been precise and have varied a bit from one analyst to another. For
example, some consider direct land use change essentially to be that which occurs in
the country where the biofuel is produced, while indirect occurs outside the country.
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Others define direct land use change (dLUC) to be when change occurs within the
production boundary of a feedstock (e.g. forest converted to agricultural land) (Bailis
2010). Indirect land use change (iLUC) is an implied change, outside the production
boundary of a feedstock (Shonnard, Williams, and Kalnes 2010). Taheripour and
Tyner use the term induced land use change which includes both direct and indirect.
Their GTAP model of land use change estimates the land use change induced by
increased biofuels production, and it can occur anywhere in the world.
There are several studies which looked at effects of land use change from
dedicated energy crops and crop residues. Dedicated energy crops such as
switchgrass require large amounts of land, and contribute to iLUC emissions
(Taheripour and Tyner 2013). Bailis and Baka conducted a study to replace
conventional jet fuel with synthetic paraffinic kerosene (SPK) from Jatropha, a
dedicated energy crop. The life cycle emissions they use for jet fuel is 88.1 kg
CO2e/GJ. With no dLUC, there are emissions of 40 kg CO2e per GJ of fuel product,
a 55 percent reduction relative to conventional jet fuel. However, for Jatropha
planted on former agricultural land, there is a net GHG reduction of 91 percent
relative to CFJ under low yields, 83 percent under medium yields, and 81 percent
under high yields. They also found that converting pasture to Jatropha may result in a
net loss of carbon. Jatropha planted on shrublands results in a net GHG increase of
193 percent if yields are low, and 14 percent if yields are high (Bailis 2010). Another
study by Shonnard et al. (2010) looked at camelina-derived jet fuel. They found
GHG life cycle emissions of 22.4 gCO2 equiv/MJ fuel, which is a reduction relative
to petroleum jet fuel of 75 percent. However, impacts of land use change were not
included in the analysis (Shonnard, Williams, and Kalnes 2010). Stratton et al. (2010)
state that avoiding land use change which results in positive GHG emissions is key
(Stratton, Wong, and Hileman 2010). On the other hand, converting crop residues to
biofuels has no significant iLUC emissions (Taheripour and Tyner 2013). Taheripour
and Tyner (2013) concluded that converting corn stover to biofuel barely affects land
use. Corn stover is a co-product, which requires little land use change. As a result,
crop residues such as corn stover do not result in positive GHG emissions. In fact, a
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study by Jin et al. (2014) found that corn stover removal decreased soil CO2 and N2O
emissions (Jin et al. 2014).
Alternative aviation biofuels can reduce life-cycle GHG emissions relative to
petroleum jet fuel. Currently, biojet is blended with petrojet at a 50%-50% blend.
This is due to a lack of aromatic compounds in biojet, which are needed to meet fuel
property and performance requirements for use in airplanes (Agusdinata et al. 2011).
Elgowainy et al. (2012) looks at three alternative aviation biofuels: Fischer-Tropsch
from natural gas, coal, and biomass, bio-jet fuel from fast pyrolysis of cellulosic
biomass, and bio-jet from vegetable and algal oils. These three pathways can be
grouped into two fuels: synthetic paraffinic kerosene (SPK) and synthetic kerosene
aromatic (SKA). FT and HEFA jet fuels are composed of paraffins and are grouped
under SPK, while pyrolysis jet fuels are composed of aromatic compounds and
grouped under SKA (Elgowainy et al. 2012). The three pathways reduce GHG
emissions by 55-85% relative to petroleum jet fuel, without considering land use
change. Jet fuel production via pyrolysis of corn stover resulted in a reduction of
well-to-wake analysis GHG emissions by 55 percent. Hydroprocessing of soybean or
algal oil reduced WTWa GHG emissions by 70 percent (Elgowainy et al. 2012). Han
et al. (2013) also concluded that all three pathways result in reduced GHG emissions
relative to petroleum jet with the range being from 41-89 percent; 41-63 percent with
hydroprocessed jet fuel, 68-76 percent with pyrolysis jet fuel, and 89 percent with
Fischer-Tropsch jet fuel from corn stover (Han et al. 2013).
Pyrolysis jet fuel GHG emission reductions relative to petroleum jet vary
depending on allocation of co-products. The percentage of reduction in GHG
emissions depends upon biochar allocation. When biochar was combusted for power
generation, WTWa GHG emissions were reduced 68 percent relative to petroleum jet.
When biochar was used in soil amendment for carbon sequestration, WTWa GHG
emissions were reduced 76 percent relative to petroleum jet (Han et al. 2013).
Elgowainy et al. (2012) also found that the amount and source of hydrogen can have
an impact on GHG emissions. When hydrogen was produced from NCG and char,
liquid fuel yield was high, but the reduction in GHG emissions only 45 percent.
When hydrogen was produced internally via pyrolysis oil and char was sequestered in
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soil applications, liquid fuel yield was reduced, but there were large reductions in
GHG emissions, at 103 percent (Elgowainy et al. 2012). Hsu (2012) concluded that
GHG emissions could be reduced more if electricity and hydrogen used in the process
are produced from biomass. This holds true as long as fuel yield does not fall to
offset the GHG savings (Hsu 2012).
Since our process uses corn stover as its feedstock, there will be no GHG
emissions associated with land use change. Thus, we will take the range of direct life
cycle emissions for fast pyrolysis produced by others to form the basis for our GHG
assessment of the process.

2.4
2.4.1

Policy Options
Reverse Auction

There are two types of auctions: traditional (or forward) and reverse. The
most common type of auction is the traditional. In a traditional auction, buyers bid on
the product being put up for auction by the seller. The highest bidder wins the
product, and the lowest unique bidder is among the losers. However, this is not the
case for reverse auctions. In a reverse auction, the lowest unique bidder wins, while
all the higher bidders lose (Gaggero 2010). In a reverse auction, the buyer initiates
the sale. The buyer controls the market since multiple sellers are offering the same
product for sale. The seller’s decrease their price for the product until a market price
is achieved. For an auction, this price is a reduced price, because the seller can see
the price level needed to get the sale (Smeltzer and Carr 2003). However, most of the
time reverse auctions are sealed bids. Therefore, the bidders submit their price, and
the lowest bid wins.
In order for a reverse auction to be successful, certain conditions must be
fulfilled. The four conditions required are the product or service specifications must
be clear and comprehensive, the purchase must be large enough to provide incentive
for the supplier to participate, the appropriate supply market conditions must exist,
and the appropriate infrastructure must exist. If a reverse auction is successful then
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reduced purchase prices, lower administrative costs, and improved inventory should
occur (Smeltzer and Carr 2003).
Reverse auctions used for government policy are always sealed bids. The
buyers put up a good or service and the bidders place bids on it. Looking specifically
at the aviation biofuel industry, the buyers would put up a long-term contract, and the
private investors would place bids on it. The bidding variable is price per gallon of
fuel. The private investor with the lowest bid wins.
The government incurs a cost with a reverse auction. The production level is
fixed regardless of the oil price. Therefore, the government may win or lose
depending on oil price. No matter what oil price, the government must pay the
contracted price per gallon of fuel. Low oil prices and higher aviation biofuel prices
results in binding of the contract. Binding simply means that the contract causes
aviation biofuels consumption to be greater than it otherwise would be (Gaffigan
2010). This is similar to what occurs with ethanol production. The binding standard
imposes an implicit tax on gas consumption which consumers pay (Tyner and
Taheripour 2008). Similarly for aviation biofuels, the contract imposes an implicit
tax on consumption when biofuel prices are higher than fossil prices, which the
government must pay. An implicit tax is simply the effect of taxes on the price of an
asset (Weisbach 1999). It acts as an implicit subsidy to the producer. At high oil
prices and low aviation biofuel prices, binding is unlikely and an implicit tax does not
occur. In fact, in this case there is an implicit tax on the biofuel producer since the
buyer is getting the product at less than market value.

2.4.2

Competitive Capital Subsidy

A competitive capital subsidy is similar to a reverse auction. Governments
use capital subsidies to lower capital costs for public interest. The private investors
compete for a capital subsidy from the government. Similar to the reverse auction,
the lowest bidder gets the subsidy. However, the bid variable is different. The
amount or percent of capital subsidy is bid on instead of the price per gallon. One
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advantage is that the government cost is all up front. However, subsidization usually
results in economic loss (Baldwin 1986).

2.4.2.1 Defense Production Act
The Defense Production Act (DPA) is an example of a competitive capital
subsidy. The act came about due to an urgent need for military manpower, supplies,
and equipment for the Korean War. It “ensures the availability of the nation’s
industrial resources to meet the national security needs of the United States” (Else
2009). Through the DPA, the domestic industry must give priority to national
security production. The President can also offer incentives within the domestic
market to enhance production and supplies when necessary (Brown 2013). Capital
subsidies are meant to allow companies to compete in markets and achieve gain.
When created in 1950, the act had seven titles. However, over the years, only
Titles I, III, and VII remain in effect (Else 2009). Title I is priority performance
authority. It allows the federal government to have timely availability of materials,
equipment, and services needed for national defense, as well as gives government
first priority over those materials, equipment, and services through contracts. The
president can also allocate and prioritize contracts to maximize domestic energy
supplies. Title III helps ensure an adequate supply of materials and goods. This title
helps stimulate private investment in production resources. Under the section for
purchases and purchase commitments, purchases provide direct subsidy to companies.
The direct subsidies help establish production capacity (Buffler 2010). Title VII
contains several distinct authorities (Brown 2013).

2.4.3

Carbon Tax

A carbon tax is a kind of Pigouvian tax. That is, it is a means of putting a
price of a non-market externality, in this case, GHG emissions. Pigou believed that
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the tax rate should be equal to social marginal damages from an additional unit of
emissions (Metcalf 2009). Those who face the tax internalize their cost. They set
their emissions level at a point where their cost is equal to the marginal benefit from
not emitting. The optimal tax rate is where marginal cost of abatement equals
marginal damages of emissions. Marginal abatement costs are the amount emissions
can decrease if an additional dollar were spent on it (Metcalf 2009). Metcalf and
Weisbach (2009) state that calculating the optimal tax rate is complex. Therefore,
there are a wide range of optimal tax rates which exist in literature.
Carbon taxes have advantages and disadvantages. One advantage of a carbon
tax is that it makes the price explicit (Metcalf 2008). As a result, it provides an
incentive for emitters of carbon dioxide emissions to reduce their emissions. A
carbon tax can reduce energy use, improve energy efficiency, and promote
development for renewable energy (Lin and Li 2011). Metcalf found that in the short
and long run, a carbon tax reduces emissions (Metcalf 2008). Similarly, Lin and Li
(2011) looked at the effect of a carbon tax on per capita CO2 emissions for 5
European countries. They found a negative impact on growth of per capita CO2
emissions in all countries. However, it was only significant in Finland (Lin and Li
2011). Although there are advantages to a carbon tax, there are also some concerns.
It can slow down economic growth, decrease social welfare, and lead to carbon
leakage (Lin and Li 2011). Carbon leakage is when companies look to shift their
business to countries that do not have a carbon tax (Metcalf 2009).
A carbon tax can be designed to encourage change in consumer behavior or to
raise revenues for carbon mitigation programs (Sumner 2009). Three issues
associated with a carbon tax in a developed country are the optimal tax base, issues
with the rate, and trade (Metcalf 2009). The tax can be collected upstream or
downstream. Both types of taxes reach consumers, but there is a difference in how it
reaches them. The tax is imposed to minimize collection and monitoring costs, while
ensuring maximum coverage (Metcalf 2009). Taxing upstream means that you are
taxing at the earliest point in the production process. Producers see the tax first when
it is imposed upstream and then pass it on to consumers, while taxing downstream
goes directly to consumers. One argument for taxing downstream is that it is more
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visible to consumers, so it will have a larger effect. However, taxing upstream results
in a lower cost per unit of tax due to economies of scale (Metcalf 2009). By imposing
a tax upstream, the tax is embedded in the price and passed on to consumers (Metcalf
2009). The tax can also be introduced one of three ways: slow ramp-up,
grandfathering existing emissions, or cold-turkey. The preferred approach is coldturkey, or without any transition (Metcalf 2009).
Trade with a carbon tax can result in an origin base system being used or a
border tax adjustment (Metcalf 2009). If two countries who wish to trade have a
carbon price, then an origin base system is preferred. An origin based system is one
without border tax adjustments. If they do not, then a border tax adjustment must be
used. A border tax adjustment system provides a rebate for taxes paid when a good is
exported and imposes a tax when a good is imported (Metcalf 2009). Some benefits
to it are it cannot be avoided by producers altering location, and it reduces the
incentive for countries to be renegades. A problem with the border tax adjustment is
how to determine the carbon content of goods that are exported or imported.
Determining the carbon content of a product can be a problem.
A carbon tax on aviation can contain even more issues. Domestic flights are
straightforward, however international flights are complicated. An option would be
to tax fuel at the refinery, but the issue is you do not know which will be used for
domestic or international flights (Metcalf 2009).
The social cost of carbon “allows agencies to incorporate social benefits of
reducing carbon dioxide emissions into cost-benefit analyses” (Interagency Working
Group 2013). It is an estimate of monetized damages due to increased carbon
emissions in a year. The Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon of the
United States Government conducted an update of their 2010 interagency technical
support document. Their revised social cost of carbon estimates were higher than
their 2010 document. The integrated assessment models (IAMs) were updated using
three models, three discount rates, and five scenarios resulting in 45 separate
distributions for global social cost of carbon. The three discount rates used were
2.5%, 3%, and 5%. The averages of annual social cost of carbon using the three
discount rates were reported, as well as a higher-than-expected 95th percentile at a 3%
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discount rate. For 2020, the SCC estimates reported were $12, $43, $65, and $129.
For 2014 at the 3% discount rate, the social cost of carbon is $37 per metric ton of
CO2 (Interagency Working Group 2013). In our analysis, we will use this rate of
$37/MT, and we will simply apply that rate to the carbon content of fossil jet fuel and
corn stover jet fuel to get a differential for the biomass based fuel.

2.5

Conclusion

Aviation biofuels production using corn stover has the potential to play a large
role in meeting the RFS cellulosic biofuels requirement. Risks in investment serve as
a road block to commercial take off. Government intervention through policy
implementation can serve as a way to reduce the uncertainty. In this section, the
relevant literature on corn stover, pyrolysis, and the three policy options has been
covered. The relevant data on corn stover and pyrolysis has also been covered from
previous literature. The next chapter presents the methodology to be used to conduct
the techno-economic analysis. Policy analysis will estimate the extent to which each
policy alternative reduces uncertainty for private sector investors and the cost to the
government of using that policy approach.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS

This chapter contains three main sections: the financial model, risk analysis, and
policy analysis. The first section provides an overview of a Discounted Cash Flow
Analysis, and breaks down the base case. The base case is first done using assumptions
followed by many engineers. This analysis is based on the Iowa State University technoeconomic analyses done by Wright et al. (2010) and Brown et al. (2013). The
assumptions are then changed in the second base case to follow reality in the marketplace
more closely. The second section details technical, system, and fuel price uncertainty
used to determine risk in investment. The last section explains how to approach the
reverse auction and carbon tax in our analysis.

3.1
3.1.1

Financial Model
Methodology

Discounted cash flow analysis is used to find the value of a project in order to
assess whether it will be successful or not. It has two steps, cost analysis and discounted
cash flow analysis, which lead to calculating a minimum fuel selling price (MFSP). It is
useful for comparing projects of different size (Towler 2013). A discounted cash flow
rate or return (DCFROR) is the interest rate at which the net present value (NPV)
equals zero. It measures the maximum rate a project can pay and still break even by the
end of the project life (Sinnott 2005). A lot of engineers use this analysis to assess
whether or not plants should be built.
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Many current studies conducting techno-economic analyses use NREL’s approach as
well as Peters and Timmerhaus installation factors. NREL’s approach calculates the total
project investment, variable operating costs, and fixed operating costs. Once these costs
are obtained, NREL conducts a discounted cash flow analysis using a lot of parameters
based off of the work done by Short et al. (1995) (Aden 2002).

3.1.1.1 Cost Analysis
Before the discounted cash flow rate of return (DCFROR) can be calculated, a
cost analysis must be done. A cost analysis includes calculating the total project
investment, variable operating costs, and fixed operating costs. The first step to
calculating the total project investment is calculating the installation cost. There are two
ways in which the installation cost can be found. The first approach is to study
everything needed to install all the equipment necessary to make the plant operational.
This approach is generally taken when the process is close to construction. When the
process is a little further away, a factor approach is used (Aden 2002). A common
engineering text used for installation factors is Peters and Timmerhaus (Brown et al.
2013b) (Aden 2002). The installation factors are applied to the equipment costs to yield
the installed cost. Aden et al. (2002) states that the standard textbook factors method was
developed for the chemical and petroleum industry, and that a better methodology may be
to use that of Delta-T (Aden 2002). Once the installed equipment cost is found, it must
be indexed to the project year. Next, indirect costs, project contingency, and working
capital expenditure must be calculated. Fixed capital investment is the sum of installed
costs, indirect costs, and project contingency. Lastly, total project investment can be
found by adding working capital expenditure, fixed capital investment, and land.
Variable operating costs include raw materials, waste handling charges, and by-product
credits (Aden 2002). They are incurred only when the process is operating. On the other
hand, fixed operating costs are incurred regardless of if the plant is running at full
capacity or not. Fixed operating costs include labor as well as other overhead items. The
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general overhead factor is 60 percent of total salaries. It includes safety, general
engineering, general plant maintenance, payroll overhead, plant security, janitorial
services, phone, light, head, and plant communications (Aden 2002). Annual
maintenance materials and insurance and taxes are also part of fixed operating costs.
Annual maintenance materials are 2 percent of total installed equipment cost, while
insurance and taxes are 1.5 percent of total installed cost. Although these are commonly
used all over the U.S., Aden et al. 2002 does state that their estimates represent Midwest
U.S. locations. All salaries must be indexed to the project year using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Aden 2002).

3.1.1.2 Discount Cash Flow Analysis
In order to find a non-risk adjusted breakeven fuel price (NRABFP), a discounted
cash flow analysis must be done. The non-risk adjusted breakeven fuel price is the price
of fuel which makes NPV equal to zero at the discounted cash flow rate of return.
Related literature refers to this fuel price as the minimum fuel selling price. However, we
will use the term non-adjusted breakeven fuel price stated above since it is a breakeven
price. The NRABFP will have a percentage chance of loss, so no one will invest at that
price. A discounted cash flow analysis requires a specified discount rate, depreciation
method, income tax rate, plant life, and construction start-up period to find the NRABFP
(Aden 2002). Aden et al. 2002 bases the discount rate, depreciation amount, and income
tax rate off of the work of Short et al. The discount rate serves as a measure of time
value. It accounts for the risk in investment (Short 1995). A discount rate of 10% is
specified in Aden et al. 2002. Short et al. states that, “In absence of statistical data on
discount rates used by industrial, transportation, and commercial investors for
investments with risks similar to those of conservation and renewable energy investments,
it is recommended that a real after-tax discount rate of 10% be used within the Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy for these sectors.” Short et al. recommends the
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) for depreciation (Aden 2002). It
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allows for two declining balance (DB) methods of depreciation. For property with a
recovery period of less than 10 years, 200% DB method is used. Property with a
recovery period greater than 10 years, 150% DB method is used (Short 1995). It also
allows for a straight line depreciation method. For a project with a recovery period less
than 10 years, it is depreciated at 200% DB until the annual depreciation values for DB
become less than straight line. A faster depreciation is preferred since a dollar earned
today is greater than a dollar earned tomorrow (Short 1995). For income tax rate, Aden
et al. 2002 uses a rate of 39 percent. This is due to the recommendation that for energy
efficiency analyses where investor-specific data is unavailable, the highest tax bracket is
used (Short 1995). The highest federal tax bracket is for large corporations who face the
tax rate used in Aden et al. (2002). The income tax is averaged over the plant life (Aden
2002). During construction there is no income, and large amounts of money are being
spent. The construction time is based on work done by Perry and Green. For small
projects, construction time is less than 18 months. Large projects can have a construction
time of up to 42 months (Perry 1997). Aden et al. 2002 uses a construction time of 2.5
years. Perry and Green also indicate that for a moderately complex plant, the start-up
should be a quarter of the construction time. As a result, Aden et al. 2002 uses a start-up
time of 6 months during which 50 percent of production is reached with 75 percent of
variable expenses and 100 percent fixed expenses. During the first 6 months 8 percent of
capital is spent. In the next 12 months, 61 percent of capital is spent. In the last 12
months of construction time, the remaining 31 percent is spent (Aden 2002).

3.1.2

Base Case

For the base case we look at two different types of analysis: engineering and
economic. The engineering analysis uses a discount cash flow analysis, while the
economic uses a cost-benefit analysis. The base year for all data is 2011.
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3.1.2.1 Engineering
The data used in this analysis comes mainly from the Iowa State University
studies by Wright et al. 2010 and Brown et al. 2013. We recreated their analysis using a
discounted cash flow rate of return analysis in order to be certain that our data used in the
economic analysis was accurate.
Brown et al. 2013 follows the analysis used by most engineers stated in the
methodology section above. Chemcad software as well as Aspen Energy Analyzer was
used to design the model. The capital cost data used was from KiOR for its 454 MTPD
facility in Columbus, MS (Brown et al. 2013b). Brown et al. 2013 also used a 2011 basis
year. In order to recreate the work of Brown et al. 2013, we first calculated the total
project investment using the installation factors shown in Table 3.1, which Brown et al.
(2013) obtained from Peters and Timmerhaus. The total project investment is the sum of
fixed capital investment, working capital, and land. All of the costs are a percentage of
total purchased equipment cost. Total purchased equipment cost is the sum of the
equipment needed to make the plant operational. Brown et al. 2013 did not provide the
data on the equipment costs used from KiOR, so we used a different method to find the
total purchased equipment cost. We plugged the equations and installation factors for
each parameter into an excel spreadsheet and used the goal seek add-in to find the total
purchased equipment cost when the total project investment is equal to $429,000,000.
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Table 3.1 Methodology for Capital Cost Estimation

Parameter
Total Purchase Equipment Cost
Purchased Equipment Installation
Instrumentation and Controls
Piping
Electrical Systems
Buildings (including services)
Yard Improvements
Service Facilities
Total Installed Cost
Installation Factor
Indirect Cost
Engineering
Construction
Legal and Contractors Feeds
Total Direct and Indirect Costs
Contingency
Fixed Capital Investment
Working Capital
Land Use
Total Project Investment

Abbrev.
TPEC
PEI

TIC
InF

TDIC
Con
FCI
WC
Land
TPI

Assumption
100%
39%
26%
10%
31%
29%
12%
55%
TPEC*InF (3.02)
3.02
0.89*TPEC
32%
34%
23%
TIC+IC
20% of TDIC
TDIC+Con
15% of FCI
6%
FCI+WC+Land

(source: (Brown et al. 2013b))

Source
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013

40
Table 3.2 Economic Assumptions
Parameter
Input Value
Real Discount Rate
10%
Nominal Interest Rate
7.50%
10 Year Depreciation
200%
Plant Depreciation Life
7
Equity
50%
Financing
50%
Loan Term
10
Project Life
23
Construction Time
3
% Spent in Year 1
8%
% Spent in Year 2
60%
% Spent in Year 3
32%
Income Tax Rate
35%

Units
%
%
%
Years
%
%
Years
Years
Years
%
%
%
%

Source
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010

(source: (Brown et al. 2013b, Wright et al. 2010))
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Table 3.3 Technical Assumptions
Parameter
Total Purchased Equipment Cost
Total Installed Cost
Total Indirect Costs
Project Contingency
Working Capital Expenditure
Total Fixed Capital Investment
Land
Total Capital Investment (with Land)
Facility Capacity
Max Annual Feedstock Use
Bio-oil Yield
Fuel Yield
Gas Conversion Rate
Diesel conversion Rate
Gallon to Litre Conversion
Naphtha Fuel Density
Diesel Fuel Density
Metric tonne to kilogram
Plant Online Time
Startup Period
Startup Production Rate
Startup Variable Expense
General Overhead
Annual Maintenance
Insurance & Taxes
Total Fixed Operating Costs
Feedstock Cost
Electricity Price
Electricity Use
Electricity Generation
Catalyst Cost
Hydrogen Price
Hydrogen Use
Fuel Sale Price

Input Value
78,631,915
237,468,382
69,982,404
61,490,157
55,341,142
368,940,944
4,717,915
429,000,000
2,000
658,460
63%
42%
21%
21%
0.264
0.745
0.847
1,000
329.23
0.75
50%
75%
60%
2%
1.50%
15,744,489
83
0.054
11,490
223,000,000
1,770,000
1.33
2,041
3

Units
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
MT/day
MT/year
Mg/Mg biomass
Mg/Mg bio-oil
Mg/Mg bio-oil
Mg/Mg bio-oil
gal/L
kg/L
kg/L
kg/MT
Days/year
Years
%
%
% of TS
% of FCI
% of FCI
$/year
$/MT
$/kWh
kW/hr
kWh/year
$/year
$/kg
kg/hr
$/GGE

Source
Calculated
Calculated
Calculated
Calculated
Calculated
Calculated
Calculated
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Calculated
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Staffell 2011
Staffell 2011
Staffell 2011
Supple 2007
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Wright et al. 2010
Calculated
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010
Brown et al. 2013

(source:(Brown et al. 2013b, Wright et al. 2010, Staffell 2011, Supple 2007))
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Total variable operating costs include the feedstock cost, catalyst replacement
cost, hydrogen cost, electricity cost, and electricity sales. The total variable operating
costs were calculated using Equations 3.1 through 3.5 shown below. The parameter
values used to calculate the costs are shown in Table 3.3
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Total fixed operating costs include total salaries and total general costs. The data
used to calculate total salaries was obtained from Wright et al. 2010, and is shown in
more detail in the appendix. General costs include overhead costs, maintenance costs,
and insurance and taxes. The assumptions for these are listed under Table 3.3.
Total fuel production was calculated using Equation 3.6 below. Using the
assumptions listed in Table 3.3, we found a facility fuel output of 58.0 MGY. Brown et
al. 2013 found a facility fuel output of 57.4 MGY. In the 2010 ISU study, Wright et al.
found a facility fuel output of 58.2 MGY. Therefore, we can be confident that our
technical parameters in Table 3.3 are functioning similarly to Brown et al. 2013
assumptions.
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Equation 3.6

In order to recreate the discounted cash flow spreadsheet and obtain a non-risk
adjusted breakeven fuel price (NRABFP), we used economic, technical, and financing
assumptions. The economic assumptions are listed in Table 3.2. Some of the important
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assumptions are a 10% discount rate, a 200% DB method with a life of 7 years, a 35%
income tax rate, a project life of 23 years, and a construction time of 3 years. There is
also 50% equity and 50% debt financing. The technical assumptions used in the
spreadsheet are listed in Table 3.3. Some of the calculations in the spreadsheet are
detailed above in Equations 3.1 through 3.6. Fuel sales were also used in the spreadsheet,
and is provided below in Equation 3.7.
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Equation 3.7

Financing and tax assumptions also affect the results of the analysis. Brown et al.
2013 and Wright et al. 2010 do not provide detail of the assumptions used. We assume
that their assumptions are similar to work done by Humbird et al. 2011 and Aden et al.
2002. There are five financing and tax assumptions listed in the table below. Humbird et
al. 2011 assume that land is paid with equity. They also assume that interest on the loan
is paid during construction time, and loan and interest are not included when you
compute taxes (Humbird 2011). Aden et al. 2002 assume that income tax is averaged
over the plant life. Lastly, Brown et al. 2013 does not specify an inflation rate.
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Table 3.4 Financing and Tax Assumptions for Engineering Analysis

Assumption

Source

(1) Land is paid with equity

Humbird et al. 2011

(2) Interest on the loan is paid during construction Humbird et al. 2011
(3) Income tax is averaged over plant life (i.e. tax
benefits or losses carry over)
Aden et al. 2002
(4) Loan and interest are not included when taxes
are computed
Humbird et al. 2011
(5) Inflation rate is zero
Brown et al. 2013
(source: (Humbird 2011, Aden 2002, Brown et al. 2013b)

The non-risk adjusted breakeven fuel price is the fuel price that makes the net
present value equal to zero. When the net present value is zero, present value benefits are
equal to present value costs. Using the assumptions listed in the Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3,
we found a minimum fuel selling price of $2.47. The goal seek add-in in Excel was used
to calculate the fuel price when net present value is set to zero. Brown et al. (2013) found
a fuel price of $2.57 when the internal rate of return is 10%. Therefore, we can be
confident that our assumptions and results are an accurate recreation of Brown et al.
(2013). The next section uses assumptions that follow a more realistic representation of
the marketplace.

3.1.2.2 Economic
Cost-benefit analysis involves conducting an economic analysis and a financial
analysis. The financial analysis accounts for financing and taxes, while the economic
does not. We present both analyses in nominal terms using Excel. As stated previously,
using a discounted cash flow analysis yielded an NRABFP of $2.47 per gallon. However,
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some costs are in real terms while others are in nominal terms. In order to calculate a
more accurate NRABFP, the costs must all be in the same terms.
There are a few differences between an engineering and economic analysis. A
comparison between the financing and tax assumptions is presented below in Table 3.5.
We assumed that land is included in calculating the total capital investment. Total capital
investment is then split evenly between debt and equity. Another difference is that
interest is capitalized (added to the total cost) during construction. Taxes are also
handled differently. Instead of carrying over, tax benefits or losses occur in the year they
occur. In computing taxable income, loan interest is subtracted from cash flow. Lastly,
we used an inflation rate of 2.5%. Costs and revenues can be expressed as current
(nominal) or constant (real) dollars. However, actual cash flows in the marketplace are
current dollars (Short 1995). As a result, we use an inflation rate to present our costs and
returns in current dollars.

Table 3.5 Comparison of Engineering and Economic Financing and Tax Assumptions

Engineering
(1) Land is paid with equity

Economic
(1) Land is included in capital investment
and the cost is split between financing and
equity
(2) Interest on the loan is paid during
(2) Interest is compounded annually
construction
during construction
(3) Income tax is averaged over plant life (i.e. (3) Tax benefits or losses occur in the
tax benefits or losses carry over)
year they occur
(4) Loan and interest are not included when (4) Loan interest is deducted from taxes
taxes are computed
(5) Inflation rate is zero
(5) Inflation rate is 2.5%

As stated previously, using the engineering assumptions we found a fuel price of
$2.47 when the internal rate of return was 10%. A comparison of the breakeven fuel
prices using engineering and economic assumptions is provided below in Table 3.6. For
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this comparison we use Brown’s tax rate of 35%. Engineering assumptions with an
inflation rate of 2.5% results in a lower fuel price of $2.43.
The fuel price which sets net present value equal to zero with a 35% tax rate and 0%
inflation when the internal rate of return is 10% is $2.62. This is substantially higher than
the fuel price found using a discounted cash flow analysis. Using the authors’
assumptions leads to higher breakeven fuel prices. Using an inflation rate of 0% leads to
a fuel price of $2.62. Adding inflation results in a decrease in the fuel price to $2.58.
Overall, we can see that changes in the financing and tax assumptions have an impact on
the breakeven fuel price.

Table 3.6 Comparison of Breakeven Fuel Prices with a 10% IRR Using Different
Assumptions and a 35% Tax Rate ($/gallon)
0% Inflation Rate
2.5% Inflation Rate

Author Assumptions
2.62
2.58

Engineering (Brown) Assumptions
2.47
2.43

The United States currently uses a statutory corporate income tax rate of 39.1%.
This includes a federal tax rate of 35% plus an average of state tax rates. Globally, the
U.S. has the highest marginal corporate income tax rate followed by Japan with 37%
(Pomerleau 2014). However, although this is the rate that is set by the law, corporations
rarely pay that tax rate. U.S. corporations take advantage of subsidies, shelters, and
special breaks (Kocieniewski 2011). David Kocieniewski from The New York Times
stated that U.S. companies pay about a 25% income tax rate. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have an average income tax
rate of 25% (Pomerleau 2014). The U.S. pays only a little more than that average
(Kocieniewski 2011). Kocieniewski (2011) also states that taxes vary by industry.
American retailers face on average about a 31% income tax rate, while manufacturers
face about a 26% income tax rate, and mining only faces a 6% income tax rate. In his
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article, Kocieniewski also states that Honeywell International paid about 22% income tax
rate, which accounted for the United States, abroad, and a large pension contribution.
Before accounting for the pension contribution, they only paid a 15% income tax rate.
United Technologies, a competitor, reported an average income tax of 24%
(Kocieniewski 2011). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that large
U.S. corporations pay an average federal tax rate of 12.6%. Adding foreign, state, and
local taxes puts the total rate at 16.9% (O'Toole 2013). Using OECD and Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) data from 2001-2008, Philip Dittmer found that corporations
paid an average effective tax rate of 24.1%. PricewaterhouseCoopers found an average
effective tax rate of 27.7% for the United States from 2006-2009, while American
Enterprise Institute found a tax rate of 29.0% (Dittmer 2011). Overall, most U.S.
corporations pay lower tax rates than what is set by the law. The tax rate we use for our
analysis is 16.9%, which is the average tax rate of 12.6% found by the GAO plus foreign,
state, and local taxes.
The two tables below show comparisons of the non-risk adjusted breakeven fuel
price at a 10% internal rate of return with two tax rates, two inflation rates, and two sets
of assumptions. They introduce the tax rate found in the paragraph above. Table 3.7
shows a comparison of NRABFP’s using Brown’s parameter values and assumptions,
while Table 3.8 uses Brown’s parameter values and the authors’ assumptions. In Table
3.7, using Brown’s tax rate of 35% and 0% inflation, the breakeven fuel price is $2.47 as
stated previously. Using the authors’ tax rate of 16.9% results in lower breakeven fuel
prices. A tax rate of 16.9% and an inflation rate of 2.5% result in a breakeven fuel price
of $2.37. When inflation is decreased to 0% there is an increase in fuel price to $2.41.
Overall, we can see that when inflation is introduced it decreases the breakeven fuel price.
This makes sense since inflation reduces the real cost of finance and taxes, which causes
the fuel breakeven price to fall. Lowering the tax rate from 35% to 16.9% also has a
visible impact, reducing the breakeven fuel price by 6 cents.
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Table 3.7 Comparison of Non-risk Adjusted Breakeven Fuel Prices at 10% IRR with
New and Old Tax Rates using Brown Parameter Values and Brown Assumptions
($/gallon)

Brown Parameter Values & Brown Assumptions
16.9% Tax Rate
35% Tax Rate
0% Inflation Rate
2.41
2.47
2.5% Inflation Rate
2.37
2.43

Table 3.8 Comparison of Non-risk Adjusted Breakeven Fuel Prices at 10% IRR with
New and Old Tax Rates using Brown Parameter Values and Author Assumptions
($/gallon)

Brown Parameter Values & Author Assumptions
16.9% Tax Rate
35% Tax Rate
0% Inflation Rate
2.56
2.62
2.5% Inflation Rate
2.51
2.58

Table 3.8 has comparatively higher breakeven fuel prices than Table 3.7. Using
the authors’ assumptions, a tax rate of 16.9%, and an inflation rate of 2.5% results in a
breakeven fuel price of $2.51. The breakeven fuel price increases to $2.56 when inflation
is reduced to zero. Similar to Table 3.7, Brown’s tax rate of 35% increases the fuel prices
as seen earlier. In comparison to Table 3.7, we see that there is a difference in breakeven
fuel prices using Brown’s assumptions versus the author’s assumptions of about 15 cents.
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3.2
3.2.1

Risk Analysis
Uncertainty

3.2.1.1 Technical Uncertainty
There are five variables which have large impacts on the non-risk adjusted
breakeven fuel price. Feedstock cost, hydrogen cost, and capital cost make up a large
percentage of the cost share as shown below in Table 3.9. Feedstock cost accounts for
the largest percentage with 34.4%. Capital cost is second with 30.3% of the cost.
Hydrogen cost is third, but still makes up 21.0% of the cost. A change in cost for any
three of these variables has a large impact on the minimum fuel selling price. The bio-oil
yield and fuel yield also impact the non-adjusted breakeven fuel price. Bio-oil yield and
fuel yield directly impact the overall fuel output. As a result, a change in fuel output has
a substantial impact on the non-adjusted breakeven fuel price.

Table 3.9 Cost shares for key variables

(source: (Petter and Tyner 2014))

3.2.1.1.1 Feedstock Cost
Feedstock cost can vary substantially due to a number of factors. The two main
factors affecting feedstock cost are location and time of year (Tyner 2010a). Crop
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rotation used can also have a large impact. Nutrient replacement cost is dependent upon
the crop rotation used. As stated in the literature review, a corn-corn rotation may have a
higher nutrient replacement cost than a corn-soybean rotation. However, a corn-corn
rotation may result in a reduction in tillage, which allows for a cost savings. The facility
size, harvest system, and storage type may also contribute to variation in the cost of
stover (Perlack 2003, Vadas and Digman 2013). Most older studies price stover at a
lower cost than more recent studies. In literature from 1998 to 2003, Brechbill and Tyner
(2008) found the total cost for corn stover per dry ton to range from a low of $19.70 to a
high of $51.60 or $22.06-$57.79/MT (Brechbill 2008). More recent studies tend to
calculate a total cost for corn stover above $60 per metric ton as shown below in Table
3.10 (Thompson and Tyner 2014, Fiegel 2012). A more recent study by Thompson and
Tyner (2014) calculates a stover cost range of $82.19-$100.57/MT. Fiegel conducts a
similar study, but excludes nitrogen as part of nutrient replacement cost. As a result, she
finds a range in stover cost of $68.06-$82.94/MT, which is lower than Thompson and
Tyner. Looking at Table 3.10, the 2013 dollars column ($/MT) cost lows seem to hover
around $60-70/MT, while the highs seem to hover around $100/MT. Based on this data
from the literature, we will assume a distribution of stover cost with a min, mode, and
max of $55/MT, $83/MT, and $100/MT.
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Table 3.10 Total Corn Stover Cost

Range
Range
Source
(Units in paper)
($/MT)
2013 dollars
$82.19-100.57/MT 82.19-100.57 82.60-101.07
Thompson and Tyner (2014)
Fiegel (2012)
$60.77-74.05/ST 68.06-82.94 68.36-83.31
Brechbill et al. (2011)
$63.00-75.00/MT 63.00-75.00 66.51-79.17
Sokhansanj and Turhollow (2004)
$60.15/MT
60.15
82.73
Aden et al. (2002)
$62.00/MT
62.00
95.06
*MT: metric tonne
*ST: short ton
*Conversion Rate $/MT: 1 short ton = 1.12 metric tonne
*Conversion Rate 2013 dollars: (2013 dollars/Source data year dollars)*Range($/MT)
(source: (Thompson and Tyner 2014, Fiegel 2012, Brechbill, Tyner, and Ileleji 2011,
Sokhansanj 2004, Aden 2002))

3.2.1.1.2 Final Fuel Yield
Final fuel yield for gasoline and diesel is obtained in two steps. The first step is
conversion of the biomass to bio-oil, and the second step is conversion of bio-oil to fuel.
Both steps have had a variety of conversion rates reported in the literature. The final fuel
yield is the product of bio-oil yield and fuel yield.
Bio-oil yield has a direct impact on the fuel yield. The higher the bio-oil yield,
the better the fuel yield since the fuel yield is a percentage of the bio-oil yield. Reaction
times have an effect on the quality and quantity of bio-oil produced. Quicker reaction
times favor higher quality bio-oil as well as higher yields (Wright et al. 2010). Yields
above 70% and below 55% are not uncommon depending on the feedstock and the type
of reactor used (Brown et al. 2013b). Wright et al.(2010) and Brown et al. (2013) both
use a min, mode, and max bio-oil yield of 55%, 63%, and 70% of biomass on a weight
basis. Brown et al. (2013) bases his yields off of the work done by Mullen et al. (2010).
Mullen (2010) finds an actual recovery of 58% bio-oil from corn stover by fast pyrolysis
using a fluidized bed reactor. To correct for a percentage of the biomass being left in the
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system he uses an optimization model, which results in a bio-oil yield of 61.7% (Mullen
et al. 2010). The type of reactor used can have an impact on the bio-oil yield. Fluidized
bed reactors generally result in higher yields than other reactors (Jahirul et al. 2012,
Sadaka). Jahirul et al. (2012) finds a range of 50-75% bio-oil yield for fast pyrolysis.
Ash content can also impact bio-oil yields (Sadaka). High contents of ash can have a
negative effect on bio-oil yields. Reported yields are summarized in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11 Corn Stover Bio-oil Yield (% biomass)

Source
Wright et al. (2010)
Brown et al. (2013)
Mullen et al. (2010)
Bridgwater (2012)
Sadaka and Boateng
Meier et al. (2013)
Zhang et al. (2013)
Jahirul et al. (2012)
Jones and Male (2012)
Jones et al. (2009)

Min
55
49
58.2
55

Mode
63
63

Max
70
70
61.7
75

60
55

75
65

50
60
59.9

75
65
66

(source: (Wright et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2013b, Mullen et al. 2010, Bridgwater 2012,
Sadaka , Meier et al. 2013, Zhang et al. 2013, Jahirul et al. 2012, Jones 2012, Jones 2009))

Fuel yield has a large impact on the non-risk adjusted breakeven fuel price.
Wright et al. (2010) found that as the fuel yield increases, the minimum fuel selling price
or as we refer to it, the NRABFP decreases. Some factors that can affect fuel yield are
the performance of the pyrolysis reactor, liquid bio-oil collection, storage, and bio-oil
yield. A reduction in reactor performance, reduced liquid bio-oil collection, losses during
storage, and a low bio-oil yield can all reduce the fuel yield (Wright et al. 2010). Wright
(2010) and Brown (2013) both report a similar mode of fuel yield at 42 wt% bio-oil.
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However, their minimum and maximum yields differ. Brown et al. (2013) bases his
range off of the work of Elliot et al. (2009). Elliot et al. (2009) finds a range of 31-61%
fuel yield from corn stover.

Table 3.12 Fuel Yield (% bio-oil)
Source
Wright et al. (2010)
Brown et al. (2013)
Elliot et al. (2009)
Jones et al. (2009)

Min

Mode
37
32
31
38

Max
42
41

47
61
61
44

(source: (Wright et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2013b, Elliott et al. 2009, Jones 2009))

Total fuel yield is the product of the percentage of bio-oil and the percentage of
fuel. The literature for bio-oil yield ranges from 49-75% biomass as shown in Table 3.11,
while the fuel yield ranges from 31-61% bio-oil as shown in Table 3.12. A recent study
by Thilakaratne et al. (2014) using woody biomass and mild catalytic pyrolysis with
hydrogen production found a fuel yield of 58.6 gallons per MT of dry biomass for their
pessimistic (base) case. They use a yield for the oil phase of 24.2 wt% biomass and a
hydroprocessing conversion of 73.4 wt% feed. This results in an overall conversion rate
of 17.7% (Thilakaratne et al. 2014). Gasoline makes up 39.9 gallons per MT, and diesel
accounts for 18.7 gallons. Thilakaratne et al. (2014) also look at an optimistic case. The
yield for the oil phase increases to 30 wt%, which causes an increase in the overall
conversion rate to 22%. The fuel yield is around 73.2 gallons per MT. Brown’s overall
conversion rate is 26.5%, which is higher than Thilakaratne’s optimistic case. Table 3.13
provides a comparison of the fuel yields from different Brown papers. Wright et al.
(2010) finds a fuel yield of 35.4 MGY or 53.8 gal/MT when hydrogen is produced, and
58.2 MGY or 88.4 gal/MT when hydrogen is purchased. Fuel yields differ depending on
if the hydrogen is produced or purchased. Plants that produce hydrogen have a higher
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output, because a portion of bio-oil is not being used for the production of hydrogen. We
will be looking at a plant that purchases hydrogen. The ratio of gasoline to diesel also
affects total fuel output. Brown et al. (2013) and Wright et al. (2010) also use a 50-50
split for fuel yield between gasoline and diesel, while Thilakaratne et al. uses 66-33 split.
Diesel is denser than gasoline, so less is produced. For bio-oil yield, the min, mode, and
max from the literature are 49%, 61.7%, and 75%. For fuel yield, the min, mode, and
max from the literature are 31%, 37%, and 44%. Table 3.14 shows the total fuel yields
using these ranges. Rather than using the extremes for our distribution, we will use the
second row in Table 3.14, which results in a min, mode, and max total fuel yields of
18.1%, 22.8%, and 27.8%.

Table 3.13 Total Fuel Yield Comparison from Brown papers
Source
Bio-oil Yield
Fuel Yield
Wright et al. (2010)
63%
42%
Brown et al. (2013)
63%
42%
Thilakaratne et al. (2014) 24.2%
73.4%
*Total Fuel Yield = Bio-oil Yield * Fuel Yield

Total Fuel Yield
26.5%
26.5%
17.8%

Gal/US Ton
97.50
96.09
64.60

Gal/MT
88.45
87.17
58.60

(source: (Wright et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2013b, Thilakaratne et al. 2014))

Table 3.14 Total Fuel Yield’s from Literature Ranges for Bio-oil and Fuel Yield
Fuel Yield

Min = 49%
Min = 31%
15.2%
Mode = 37%
18.1%
Max = 44%
21.6%

Bio-oil Yield
Mode = 61.7%
19.1%
22.8%
27.1%

(source: Calculated)

Max = 75%
23.3%
27.8%
33.0%
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3.2.1.1.3 Hydrogen Cost
Hydrogen cost contributes significantly to operating costs. The two least
expensive feedstocks for hydrogen production are coal and natural gas (2012). The
United States Department of Energy conducted a multi-year technical plan for the
production of hydrogen. They looked at distributed natural gas H2A cost distributions.
H2A is an analysis group who develop frameworks needed to analyze hydrogen
technologies (2006). Using the H2A model, the U.S. Department of Energy found a
levelized production cost for hydrogen of $2.00/kg in 2011, which is shown in Table 3.15.
The dispensed cost, which includes compression, storage, and dispensing was $4.50/kg in
2011 (2012, Brown et al. 2013b). Estimating for 2015, they found a production cost for
hydrogen of $2.10/kg and a dispensed cost of $3.80/kg. However, we assume that plants
will use the hydrogen right away, so there is little need for hydrogen storage. NREL’s
study focused on production of hydrogen from reforming of natural gas. They found a
range for hydrogen total cost for 2005 of $2.75-$3.50/kg using the H2A model. The
Producer Price Index for Industrial Commodities allows us to adjust the range to 2011
dollars (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). After adjusting to 2011 dollars, we obtain a
range of $3.47-$4.42/kg. A recent study by Zhang et al. use a hydrogen cost of $3.33/kg,
which is based on averages from the U.S. Energy Information Administration Annual
Energy Outlook. Wright et al. (2010) and Brown et al. (2013) both use a much lower
hydrogen cost of $1.50/kg and $1.33/kg. Looking at Table 3.15, the hydrogen cost in the
min column hovers around $2.00-2.50/kg. The hydrogen cost in the max column hovers
around $4.00-4.50/kg. The hydrogen costs that make up the min, mode, and max are
$2.25/kg, $3.25/kg, and $4.25/kg.
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Table 3.15 Hydrogen Cost ($/kg)

Source
Wright et al. (2010)
Brown et al. (2013)
Zhang et al. (2013)
NREL (2006)
Technical Plan (2012)

Min
0.98
2.33
3.47
2.00

Mode
1.50
1.33
3.33

Max
1.96
4.33
4.42
4.50

(source: (Wright et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2013b, Zhang et al. 2013, 2006, 2012)

3.2.1.1.4 Capital Cost
Large variations in estimated capital costs for fast pyrolysis plants exist.
Cleveland (1984) states that history has shown we underestimate capital costs of new
energy process plants by more than 100 percent (Cleveland 1984). Another study found
that process plant projects generally have underestimated capital costs (Merrow 1983).
Merrow looked at more than 40 Rand process plants spanning 20 years, and there was a
consistent underestimation. He found that cost estimates which were made before
engineering was well advanced were poor estimates. We will be looking at an nth plant,
which is the cost of a plant built at some point in the future after some engineering
experience has been gained. Merrow (1983) also found that even when little or no new
technology was introduced, plants may still have poor estimates. One possibility for why
cost estimates are poor whether new technology is introduced or not is because cost
estimations for capital projects is complex (Merrow 1983). Therefore, we want to use
capital cost that accounts for underestimation. Brown et al. (2013) calculates a total
project investment of $429 million, and uses a distribution of $288-$463 million for total
project investment as shown in Table 3.16. Therefore, his distribution only accounts for
an 8 percent underestimation. In the study preceding Brown, Wright et al. (2010)
calculates a capital cost of $200 million, and uses a distribution of $83-$247 million.
This accounts for about a 24 percent underestimation in his distribution. Cleveland (1984)
and Merrow (1983) show through history that plant capital cost is commonly
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underestimated.

In order to account for this underestimation, we will use a distribution

for capital cost of $365 million, $429 million, and $600 million (min, mode, max). This
accounts for a 15 percent overestimation and a 40 percent underestimation in capital costs.

Table 3.16 Capital Cost (million $)
Source
Wright et al. (2010)
Brown et al. (2013)

Min
83
288

Mode
165
429

Max
247
463

(source: (Wright et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2013b))

3.2.1.1.5 Summary
The use of the new parameter values specified above will help us to calculate a
more accurate breakeven fuel price. The mean values were calculated from the new
parameter value ranges and are shown in Table 3.17.

Table 3.17 List of New Parameter Values

Parameter
Feedstock Cost ($/MT)
Final Fuel Yield (% biomass)
Hydrogen Cost ($/kg)
Capital Cost ($ million)

Min
55
18.1
2.25
365

Mode
83
22.8
3.25
429

Max
110
27.8
4.25
600

Mean
82.83
22.85
3.25
446.83
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Table 3.18 Comparison of New and Old Parameters
Parameter
Feedstock Cost ($/MT)
Final Fuel Yield (% biomass)
Hydrogen Cost ($/kg)
Capital Cost ($ million)
Tax Rate (%)
Inflation Rate (%)

Author
82.83
22.85
3.25
446.83
16.9%
2.5%

Brown
83
26.5
1.33
429
35%
0%

Using the mean of the new parameter values, we can calculate a new non-risk
adjusted breakeven fuel price. All of the new parameters shown in Table 3.18 under
Author are used including the four mean values, the tax rate of 16.9%, and inflation rate
of 2.5%. The breakeven fuel price is substantially higher than the breakeven fuel prices
with the old parameter values in Table 3.7 and 3.8. With all of the new parameters the
fuel price is $3.58 per gallon.
The increase in prices is due primarily to the increase in hydrogen cost and
decrease in final fuel yield from the old parameter values. A comparison of the new and
old parameter values is provided in Table 3.18. Brown uses a hydrogen cost of $1.33,
which is not in our range of values for hydrogen in Table 3.17. Current literature showed
a higher cost range for hydrogen with our mean being $3.25/kg. This is almost a $2.00
difference between the old and new parameter values, which has a large impact on the
breakeven fuel price. The final fuel yield also decreases from the old parameter values.
Brown et al. 2013 found that fuel yield was the most important parameter. We also see
those findings.
Figure 3.1 provides a breakdown by major cost category of the breakeven fuel
price. The breakdown of breakeven fuel price is provided for 4 different cases: (1) using
all of Brown’s assumptions, (2) the author’s assumptions and Brown’s conversion rate,
and (3) all of the author’s assumptions with conversion rate impact separated out, and (4)
all of the author’s assumptions with the new conversion rate incorporated . The sum of
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all the parameters in each bar is the breakeven fuel price. The breakeven fuel price using
Brown’s assumptions was $2.47 per gallon and is represented by the stacked bar on the
left. The breakeven fuel price using the author’s assumptions was $3.58 and is
represented by the two stacked bars on the right. Each parameter was added individually
to see the impact it has on the breakeven fuel price. Using Brown’s conversion rate and
the new parameters versus the old parameters had a substantial impact on the breakeven
fuel price. Each parameter had a larger impact on the price under the author’s
assumptions. The capital cost accounted for $0.97 using Brown’s assumptions.
Increasing the capital cost by about $18 million, increases the capital cost share to $1.05
using the author’s assumptions and Brown’s conversion rate. Feedstock and other
operating cost shares increase a little bit from Brown’s assumptions to the author’s
assumptions. The largest difference in breakeven fuel prices between the two sets of
assumptions is hydrogen cost. As shown in Figure 3.1, hydrogen cost accounts for $0.90
of the breakeven fuel price.
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Figure 3.1 Breakdown of Impact each Parameter has on Non-risk Adjusted Breakeven
Fuel Prices ($/gallon)

There is also a decrease in the final fuel yield from Brown’s assumptions to the
author’s assumptions from 26.5% biomass to 22.85% biomass. This results in a decrease
of annual production from 58.0 million gallons to 50.1 million gallons. Figure 3.1 shows
the change in breakeven price due to a change in annual fuel production from the second
stacked bar to the third one. We calculated the change in final fuel yield as dollars per
gallon. Decreasing the fuel yield to 50.1 million gallons from the author’s assumptions &
Brown conversion to all of the authors assumptions results in an increase in price by
$0.49 per gallon and vice versa. We also created a fourth stacked bar, where the
conversion rate is imbedded in the four parameters. This demonstrates how much impact
a change in final fuel yield can have on the breakeven fuel price.
We also calculated the NPV cost and cost share percentage for the new key cost
parameters in Table 3.19. The key parameters are capital cost, feedstock, hydrogen, and
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other operating costs. Capital cost, feedstock, and hydrogen contribute to more than 90%
of the cost share. Capital cost makes up the largest percentage of cost at around 34%.
Feedstock and hydrogen are the second and third largest with cost shares of 30.4% and
29.2%. Other operating costs contribute to less than 7% of the cost. The cost values and
cost shares for the key parameters presented below are the same as what is shown above
in Figure 3.1 in the fourth stacked bar on the right.

Table 3.19 Cost Shares and Levels for the Key Parameters

Parameter
Capital Cost
Feedstock
Hydrogen
Other Operating Costs
Total

NPV Cost ($)
$310,234,132
$278,661,106
$267,805,540
$60,066,395
$916,767,172

Cost Share (%)
33.8%
30.4%
29.2%
6.6%
100.0%

The cost shares and levels calculated above are relatively close to the ones shown
previously in Table 3.9. Capital cost has the largest cost share instead of feedstock due to
an increase of about $17 million in its mean value. Hydrogen also makes up a larger cost
share than shown in Table 3.9. Although the cost shares and levels are similar, the cost
per gallon differs from the two studies. Petter and Tyner 2014 calculate a breakeven fuel
price of $2.62 per gallon. Our cost is substantially higher due to the decrease in
production and increase in hydrogen cost. Petter and Tyner use a production similar to
Brown et al. 2013, while we use one that is about 8 million gallons per year less.
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3.2.1.2 Fuel Price Uncertainty
In the 2013 annual energy outlook, the U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) projects jet fuel prices from 2011 to 2040 in real terms in 2010 dollars per gallon
(2013a). The base year we use is 2011. Adjusting them to 2011 dollars, the 2011 jet fuel
price is $3.14 with projections increasing to $4.31 by 2040. The annual growth is
expected to be 1.1 percent.
We use two jet fuel price projections to capture uncertainty on the expected return
on investment. The two jet fuel price projections used are (1) a stochastic fuel price with
no trend and (2) a stochastic fuel price that increases over time at a rate of the EIA jet
fuel price projections stated above. We use an initial fuel price of $3.03, which is an
average of the wholesale/resale price for jet fuel and diesel by refiners. The price is in
real terms.
There are two main types of stochastic processes used for forecasting oil prices:
Brownian motion and mean reversion. Brownian motion is not stationary and the price
follows a random walk with a drift, while mean reversion is stationary and reverts to a
trend line that increases or decreases (Pindyck 1999). There is much debate among
researchers over which process is better.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using both Brownian motion and mean
reversion. Geometric Brownian motion can over or underestimate values, and has more
risk involved (Pindyck 1999). There are a few advantages to using GBM as opposed to
mean reversion. One advantage is that it allows for combined effect of uncertainty. The
GBM accounts for a worst scenario for investors (Postali and Picchetti 2006). Another
advantage is that is has high price variability. Mean reversion has a lower level of
uncertainty than GBM. This is due to mean reverting process prices fluctuating around
the long-run equilibrium. Mean reversion is a little more realistic.
The key factor in determining which process to use is the speed of mean reversion.
Researchers agree that if mean reversion is fast, then a mean reversion process is
preferred. On the other hand, if mean reversion is slow, then Brownian motion is not a
bad option for forecasting oil prices (Pindyck 1999, Postali and Picchetti 2006). Pindyck
1999 looked at the long-run evolution of energy prices. He looked at oil prices from
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1870 to 2000. The prices were deflated to 1967 dollars using Wholesale Price Index for
1870 through 1970 and Producer Price Index for 1970 through 2000. The natural
logarithm of oil prices were taken. From 1900 to 1970, Pindyck found that prices stayed
close to the average, which suggests mean-reverting. The log real price mean reverted to
a trend line. However, the mean reversion took up to a decade to occur, which is very
slow (Pindyck 1999). Pindyck concludes that his figures suggest there is a slow rate of
mean reversion. As a result, the geometric Brownian motion process is not bad. He
states that GBM is unlikely to cause large errors in the optimal investment rule. Postali
and Picchetti 2006 also state that prices are not instantaneous. There is a lag in price on
the demand and supply side (Postali and Picchetti 2006). The trend in oil prices is
evaluated using a unit root test (Pindyck 1999, Postali and Picchetti 2006). Postali and
Picchetti 2006 found that a larger sample size is needed to reject the null hypothesis. The
null hypothesis was > - 1  0, where ρ is the asymptotic variance. The data generating
process equation was @  >@AB C D@ , where εt is the stochastic term and the variance

must be ρ<1. The variance was given by E F ">%  "1 - >F %/, where T was the number

of years. It was only possible to reject unit root when the length of time was more than a
century. This suggests that the speed of mean reversion is very slow. As a result,
geometric Brownian motion is a good process for forecasting oil prices (Pindyck 1999,
Postali and Picchetti 2006).
Geometric Brownian motion is a little simpler than mean reversion, requiring one
less variable. The equation for GBM is below

  H C EI

Equation 3.8

where P is the oil price, α is the expected growing rate, t is time, σ is the instantaneous
standard deviation, and Z is the Wiener process. The returns from taking the log of dP

have normal distributions, and is expressed mathematically as ~K"H, E%. The
expected growing rate as well as the instantaneous standard deviation are constant
(Postali and Picchetti 2006).
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The process we use is a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). In order to calculate
the projected prices for our project we use a similar equation. The equation used to
calculate our projected prices is

@  @AB   M C D

Equation 3.9

where Pt is the price at time t, Pt-1 is the price in the previous year, r is the expected

growth rate, and D is the random component. We used the steps listed below to find the
stochastic increasing price.

1) Collected wholesale/resale jet fuel prices for the past 20 years from 1993 to 2013
(Energy Information Administration 2014)
2) Prices were adjusted to 2011 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2014)
3) The change in price from year to year from 1993 to 2013, standard deviation of
changes in prices from 1993 to 2013, and expected annual growth rate from DOE
projections were calculated.
The random component was a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of about 0.46. Standard deviation was calculated using the differences in jet
fuel wholesale/resale prices by refiners from year to year.
We ran a check to make sure Brownian motion was okay to use for our analysis.
We took the projected price in year 2034, the last year of the project, from Brownian
motion with a drift jet fuel prices and made it an output in @Risk. We ran the simulation,
and found that the output was normal. The skewness was near 0 and kurtosis was near 3
as they should be for a normal distribution.
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Figure 3.2 Comparison of Jet Fuel Price Projections

Figure 3.2 shows a comparison of the different jet fuel price projections. All of
the prices are in real terms. The Brownian motion with a drift jet fuel prices follow the
EIA projected jet fuel prices closely. EIA projected jet fuel prices are slightly higher than
the projected prices from Brownian motion.
We regressed diesel and jet fuel wholesale prices from 2004 to 2013. The
regression showed an R square of 99.8%, which shows high correlation between the
prices. In order to find diesel projected prices based on jet fuel projected prices we used
the intercept and slope of the regression. Using the intercept and slope we found
equation 3.10 below for diesel price.

8 @  -0.014 C 1.015  P ( @

Equation 3.10

We assume that 50% of the fuel produced is jet fuel and 50% is diesel. By taking
the average price of jet fuel and diesel each year, we get a combined price.
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3.3
3.3.1

Policy Analysis
Reverse Auction

As stated in the literature review, a reverse auction is when bidders bid on a
contract to produce a product, and the lowest unique bidder wins. The bid variable in our
case is price per gallon of fuel. The government puts up a long-term contract for a certain
quantity of fuel to be produced, and the private investor with the lowest bid price per
gallon of fuel wins. Once the winner is chosen, they enter a contract with the government.
The production level is fixed at the amount that is stated in the contract, and the
government must pay the price per gallon bid that won. The government can win or lose
depending on the price of oil and aviation biofuels. If low oil prices occur in the market
and the contract price for aviation biofuels is high, then the government loses. The
government faces an implicit tax. On the other hand, if oil prices are high and the
contract price of aviation biofuels is low, then the government wins. Biofuel producers
would face an implicit tax since the buyer is purchasing the product at less than market
value. The average difference in the contract price and market price equals government
cost.
We will approach a reverse auction by doing sensitivity on two main factors. The
first is length of the contract. We will evaluate contract lengths of 5, 10, and 15 years.
All biofuel not sold under contract is assumed to be sold at the uncertain market price.
The second sensitivity is on how we determine the bid value. In the first case, we
assume private investors are risk neutral. The standard breakeven fuel price is one with
about a 50% probability of losing money. However, a risk neutral bidder might bid this
value. More likely, bidders would be risk averse, and their lowest price bids may all be
higher than they would be otherwise. For example, we assume that the winning bid would
be the price at which the probability of a loss is no more than 25%.
There are many variants of reverse auctions. There can be minimum or maximum
prices (called collars), and prices can have inflators included. For example, we will
consider a case in which the initial bid value goes up at the rate of the DOE reference
price case for aviation biofuel.
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3.3.2

Carbon Tax

A carbon tax is a Pigouvian tax that puts a price on negative externalities. In this
case the negative externality associated with aviation fuel is greenhouse gas emissions.
The way we approach a carbon tax is to apply it to the carbon content of the fuel. Fossil
jet fuel and corn stover jet fuel have different carbon contents. We will use the social
cost of carbon calculated by the Interagency Working Group. The social cost of carbon
allows us to include a social benefit in the cost-benefit analysis. The social benefit is the
benefit from reducing carbon dioxide emissions. We will apply the 2014 social cost of
carbon found by the Interagency Working Group with a 3% average discount rate of $37
per metric ton of CO2 to both the carbon content of fossil jet fuel and corn stover jet fuel.
This will allow us to get a differential for the corn stover based fuel.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

Chapter 4 presents the results of five cases: deterministic, stochastic, reverse
auction, capital subsidy, and carbon tax. For the deterministic case, results are shown
with the fuel price of $3.03/gallon calculated above in the fuel price uncertainty section,
as well as the breakeven fuel price. Results for the stochastic case are shown when there
is no drift in fuel price and when there is one. For a reverse auction and capital subsidy,
results are reported for contract lengths of 5, 10, and 15 years. Our results focus on the
financial analysis, although both the financial and economic results are reported.

4.1

System Economics

4.1.1

Deterministic

4.1.1.1 Base Case Results
The base case is deterministic with all of the variables fixed at mean values over
the life of the project. Feedstock cost, final fuel yield, hydrogen cost, and capital cost are
fixed at their mean values stated in Table 3.17 in the previous chapter. Fuel price is fixed
at $3.03/gallon. This is the average of the wholesale/resale price for jet fuel and diesel by
refiners. Three discounted measures of project worth are calculated: net present value
(NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), and benefit-cost ratio (B/C). The economic analysis
is before financing and taxes, while the financial analysis is after financing and taxes.
We report the results with all of the variables fixed as stated above, and then find the
breakeven fuel price for the financial analysis.
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The results with all variables fixed and a fuel price of $3.03/gallon are reported in
Table 4.1. All three discounted measures of project worth have different criterions for
accepting a project. A project is accepted when the net present value is greater than zero.
For the internal rate of return, the IRR must be greater than the discount rate. Benefitcost ratio is the ratio of discounted benefits to discounted costs. A project is accepted
when the B/C is greater than one. In Table 4.1, both NPV’s using a fuel price of $3.03
are negative. The internal rate of return for both analyses is less than the real discount
rate of 10%. The last discounted measure of project worth, B/C, also fails the criterion
for acceptance of the project. This demonstrates the reality that without government
intervention, investors would not be likely to find the plants attractive.

Table 4.1 Case 1 Results: Deterministic Results with Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon
Economic
Financial

NPV
IRR (real)
($194,251,397)
3.0%
($140,250,724)
2.2%

B/C
0.52
0.37

We found the breakeven fuel price with all of the variables fixed. The breakeven
fuel price is the price at which a plant is neither running at a loss nor profit. We found
the breakeven fuel price for the financial analysis instead of the economic since it is more
realistic, accounting for financing and taxes. Using the goal seek tool in excel, we found
the fuel price which sets NPV equal to zero. The breakeven fuel price was $3.58/gallon.
This is the same value reported in the previous chapter. At a breakeven fuel price of
$3.58/gallon, the financial NPV was zero, the IRR was 10%, and the B/C was equal to
one as shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2 Case 1 Results: Deterministic Results with Breakeven Fuel Price of
$3.58/gallon
Economic
Financial

NPV
($25,477,962)
$0

IRR (real)
9.2%
10.0%

B/C
0.94
1.00

The NPV, IRR, and B/C are all better in the financial then in the economic
analysis. This may not always be the case, although most of the time it holds true
throughout our results. Economic analysis gives a public perspective, while financial
analysis gives a private perspective. The results are not the same between the analyses
due to three differences: (1) treatment of taxes and subsidies, (2) economic values versus
private, and (3) interest on capital. The financial analysis results may be better for two
reasons. One reason is if the nominal interest rate is less than the real discount rate, the
project return increases. The IRR of a project is equal to the debt ratio times the IRR on
debt plus the equity ratio times the IRR on equity. Therefore, as the equity ratio
decreases, the return on investment increases. The second reason is financing benefits
may exceed tax payments. If tax payments are greater than the benefits from financing,
then the economic NPV may be better than the financial.

4.1.2

Stochastic

Stochasticity shows uncertainty in the results. The Palisade Corporation software
@Risk was used to determine the risk of investment in aviation biofuels for the stochastic
cases. Monte Carlo analysis is used to predict the uncertainty in NPV. By using a pert
distribution for the four technical variables stated in section 3.2.1.1, uncertainty is
incorporated into the spreadsheet. We assume perfect correlation for the technical
variables. That is, once a random draw is taken for any of the uncertain technical
variables, it holds throughout all the years of the investment (for that iteration). In other
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words, perfect correlation means the values are perfectly correlated through time. As a
result, the values for the technical variables do not change from year to year. There is
also no correlation among our four technical variables. They are assumed to be
independent of each other. The stochastic case was run with both of the jet fuel price
projections stated in the fuel price uncertainty section. The initial fuel price for each
projection was $3.03/gallon. A breakeven fuel price was found for each projection.
Results were reported for both prices. The mean, standard deviation, and probability of
loss are reported in the tables for both economic and financial analysis.

4.1.2.1 Stochastic with No Trend in Fuel Price
The results in Table 4.3 were found using a steady stochastic fuel price of
$3.03/gallon. The mean, standard deviation, and probability of loss are reported for the
NPV, IRR, and B/C. The mean NPV’s are negative, with the financial analysis being less
negative than the economic analysis. Figure 4.1 shows a probability density graph for the
financial NPV. The values on the horizontal axis are in billions ($). There is a 90%
probability the NPV lies between -$653 million and $392 million. This is quite a large
distribution. In Table 4.3, the standard deviation and probability of loss are less in the
financial analysis than in the economic. This is seen throughout all of the results.
Standard deviation is reduced due to taxes being included. The inclusion of taxes reduces
gains and losses. The standard deviation is a result of the input distributions from the
uncertain variables. There is a reduction of almost $65 million from the economic to the
financial analysis. Probability of loss also decreases over 2 percent from 69.9 percent to
67.5 percent for the NPV.
There can be errors in IRR when stochastic simulations are run. Table 4.3 has
IRR’s for both the economic and financial analysis which contain errors. As a result the
IRR will be inconsistent with the NPV and B/C. Errors occur in @Risk when it cannot
return a result for the calculation. This is commonly due to all or most flows being
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positive or negative for any given iteration. These results for IRR are seen consistently
throughout our stochastic results.

Table 4.3 Case 2 Results: Stochastic Results with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price of
$3.03/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($194,063,200)
10.7%
0.52
($140,094,000)
11.9%
0.38
Standard Deviation $379,790,200
9.2%
0.94
$315,364,000
11.0%
1.41
Probability of Loss
69.9%
67.5%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation

Figure 4.1 Case 2: Financial NPV with a Steady Stochastic Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon

We found the breakeven fuel price for when there is no trend in the fuel price.
For a steady stochastic fuel price, the breakeven fuel price was $3.58/gallon. This is over
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a fifty cent increase from the fuel price used initially. Increasing the fuel price, increases
the mean NPV for both economic and financial. The mean NPV is positive for the
financial analysis in Table 4.4. Standard deviation remains relatively the same due to
input distributions remaining the same. The biggest difference between Tables 4.3 and
4.4 is the probability of loss. With a fuel price of $3.03/gallon, the probability of loss for
NPV hovers around 70 percent, while with a fuel price of $3.58/gallon it hovers around
50 percent.

Table 4.4 Case 2 Results: Stochastic Results with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price of
$3.58/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($25,273,960)
14.0%
0.94
$169,872
16.1%
1.01
Standard Deviation $381,332,200
9.3%
0.95
$316,645,900
11.3%
1.42
Probability of Loss
53.1%
50.2%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation
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Figure 4.2 Case 2: Financial NPV with a Steady Stochastic Fuel Price of $3.58/gallon

An increase in the fuel price makes the financial NPV range less negative, but
larger. There is a 90 percent probability the NPV lies between -$515 million and $534
million. This is a shift of about $100 million to the right from Figure 4.1.
In comparison to work done by Petter and Tyner 2014, we see larger NPV ranges,
larger standard deviations, and higher probabilities of loss. Petter and Tyner 2014 used
three uncertain variables: hydrogen price, feedstock price, and fuel yield (bio-oil yield).
We introduce capital cost as an uncertain variable. There are differences in fuel yield.
Our fuel yield is much lower, accounting for a total fuel yield calculation versus one
focused on bio-oil yield. The tax rate used is also lower than in their report. These
factors contribute to the differences in results. As a result, we see higher probabilities of
loss than were seen in their paper. Higher breakeven fuel prices compensate for a little
bit of the increase in uncertainty. Petter and Tyner 2014 saw around a 40 percent
probability of loss for the financial mean NPV when fuel price was stochastic and steady,
which is about 10 percent less than ours.
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Overall, there is a lot of risk for an investment in this case. When a fuel price of
$3.03/gallon is used, the probability of loss is 70 percent. Private investors would be
discouraged from making an investment. When the breakeven is found, the probability
of loss is reduced, however, it is still 50 percent.

4.1.2.2 Stochastic with Increasing Fuel Price
For this case, the stochastic fuel price is increasing at a rate derived from DOE
projections. The initial fuel price was $3.03/gallon, increasing to a price of $3.83/gallon
in the last year of the plant life. The mean NPV’s in Table 4.5 are still negative.
However, they are less negative then the case where a steady fuel price of $3.03/gallon
was used in Table 4.3. Standard deviation is larger when the fuel price is increasing then
when it was steady. It is also less in the financial analysis than in the economic. In
comparison to Table 4.3, the probability of loss decreases substantially. An initial fuel
price of $3.03 results in a probability of loss of 56.6 percent for the financial analysis.
There is a decrease of about 10 percent from using a steady stochastic fuel price of
$3.03/gallon versus one that increases over the plant life. In Figure 4.3, there is also a
shift to the right in the range for the financial NPV, which is the same as what was seen
in the steady fuel price case. There is a 90 percent probability the financial NPV falls
between -$603 million and $518 million.

Table 4.5 Case 3 Results: Stochastic Results with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price
Initially at $3.03/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($90,267,960)
12.6%
0.78
($53,840,140)
14.1%
0.77
Standard Deviation $406,901,900
9.2%
1.01
$337,908,200
11.1%
1.52
Probability of Loss
59.1%
56.6%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation
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Figure 4.3 Case 3: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price Initially at
$3.03/gallon

These results are different from the results Petter and Tyner found with an
increasing stochastic fuel price. With an initial fuel price of $2.68/gallon increasing to
$3.41/gallon, both mean NPV’s were positive at around $80 million. Our mean NPV’s in
Table 4.5 were both negative. Standard deviation was about four times larger in our
results than theirs. Their results also saw lower probabilities of loss, 14.5% probability of
loss for the financial NPV. Although our probabilities of loss decreased from the steady
stochastic price to the increasing stochastic price, they did not decrease that much. This
is largely due to the higher fuel price.
The initial breakeven fuel price for the financial case when fuel price is increasing
stochastically is $3.22/gallon. The fuel price increases over the plant life to a price of
$4.07/gallon. In comparison to using an initial fuel price of $3.03/gallon, the mean and
standard deviation of the NPV for both analyses remain about the same. Probability of
loss decreases. For the NPV, there is about a 6 percent decrease in probability of loss
from Table 4.5. The probability of losses in Table 4.6 are relatively similar to the ones in
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Table 4.4, where fuel price was the breakeven fuel price when prices were steady,
because they both are reporting results for the breakeven fuel price.

Table 4.6 Case 3 Results: Stochastic Results with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price
Initially at $3.22/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($25,266,780)
13.9%
0.94
175,837
15.7%
1.01
Standard Deviation $407,485,100
9.2%
1.01
338,393,000
11.2%
1.52
Probability of Loss
52.7%
50.2%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation

Figure 4.4 Case 3: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price Initially at
$3.22/gallon
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Introducing uncertainty into the spreadsheet allows us to determine the risk
involved in investment. Without any policies, we see the results shown in Tables 4.3-4.6.
When breakeven fuel price is found for both cases, the probability of loss is reduced to
50.2 percent. This is still a large probability of loss. As a result, some policy
intervention may be needed to reduce the probability of loss.

4.2
4.2.1

Policy Analysis
Reverse Auction

A variety of cases were conducted for a reverse auction. The four main cases are
(1) a stochastic fuel price with no trend where producers bid a breakeven fuel price with
50% probability of loss, (2) a stochastic fuel price with no trend where producers bid a
breakeven fuel price with 25% probability of loss, (3) a stochastic fuel price that
increases over time where producers bid a breakeven fuel price with 50% probability of
loss, and (4) a stochastic fuel price that increases over time where producers bid a
breakeven fuel price with 25% probability of loss. Within these four cases, four contract
lengths are analyzed. The contract length builds from zero to fifteen years. Currently,
the Navy has contracts for five years. We wanted to evaluate the impacts longer contract
lengths can have on the probability of loss. The contract quantity used was 42 million
gallons per year. We made our annual fuel production of about 50 million gallons an
output in @Risk. At 0 percent probability of loss, the lowest quantity was around 42
million gallons per year, so that is what we made our contract quantity. Once again we
focus on the financial analysis since it is more realistic than the economic. We also
calculated the cost to government for each of the four cases and each contract length.
For the reverse auction, we created two columns in our spreadsheet. One column
was the market price, and the other was the reverse auction price. When the contract was
in effect, the reverse auction price was used, and when it was not, the market price was
used. We made the fuel sales into an IF statement. If the plant year was less than or
equal to the contract length, the statement returns the contract quantity times the reverse
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auction price plus annual production minus the contract quantity times the market price.
For all other years, fuel sales is just annual production times the market price.

4.2.1.1 Stochastic without Drift in Fuel Price
4.2.1.1.1 Producers Bid Breakeven Fuel Price with 50% Probability of Loss
The first case is a reverse auction with a stochastic fuel price with no trend where
producers bid a breakeven fuel price with 50 percent probability of loss. Both the market
price and the reverse auction price are steady over the plant life. The market fuel price is
$3.03/gallon, and the reverse auction fuel price is $3.58/gallon. For this case, the fuel
price of $3.58/gallon is the breakeven fuel price for a steady price case when there is no
contract. Note that the 0 contract years case reverts to the previous case with no contract
since the previous price regime is always in force. Therefore, when the contract length is
0 years, the fuel price reverts to the market price of $3.03/gallon. As a result, we see
negative NPV’s since the market price is not large enough to compensate for the costs.
The market fuel price has stochasticity in it for all cases, while the reverse auction fuel
price does not.

Table 4.7 Case 4-1 Economic Results: Reverse Auction Results with Stochastic Fuel
Price with No Trend and Producers Bid Breakeven with 50% Probability of Loss
Economic
Length of
Contract
0
5
10
15

Min
($1,564,155,000)
($1,144,703,000)
($796,660,900)
($573,817,500)

Max
Mean
$1,141,450,000 ($194,063,200)
$964,687,600 ($134,184,100)
$675,631,400 ($93,332,900)
$494,160,100 ($67,969,270)

Standard
Deviation
$379,790,200
$299,152,400
$210,488,500
$143,462,600

Probability
of Loss
69.9%
67.2%
68.0%
69.8%
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Table 4.8 Case 4-1 Financial Results: Reverse Auction Results with Stochastic Fuel Price
with No Trend and Producers Bid Breakeven with 50% Probability of Loss
Financial
Length of
Contract
0
5
10
15

Min
($1,271,222,000)
($922,656,600)
($636,738,800)
($451,555,800)

Max
$970,865,100
$823,975,700
$583,769,900
$431,806,900

Mean
($140,094,000)
($90,334,470)
($56,387,110)
($35,309,930)

Standard
Deviation
$315,364,000
$248,301,400
$174,502,400
$118,609,400

Probability
of Loss
67.5%
64.4%
63.3%
63.5%

For all of the reverse auction cases we reported the mean, standard deviation, and
probability of loss for the NPV. For the cases where producers bid with a 50%
probability of loss we also reported the minimum and maximum. Tables 4.7 and 4.8
report the economic and financial results for a steady fuel price case when producers bid
with 50% probability of loss. In both tables the mean NPV increases, becomes less
negative, as the contract length increases. For the financial analysis, mean NPV
decreases from $140 million to $35 million. The standard deviation also decreases as the
contract length increases. It decreases at a larger rate than the mean NPV, decreasing by
almost $200 million from no contract to a 15 year contract. For all reverse auction cases,
we expect to see an increase in mean NPV and a decrease in standard deviation. We
would also expect that as the contract length increases, the probability of loss decreases,
however, that is not what we see in either of the tables. When producers bid a breakeven
fuel price with 50% probability of loss, the NPV hovers around zero when the contract
length is fifteen years. The minimum, maximum, and mean slowly converge to zero as
the contract length increases. Since the NPV hovers around zero, the probability of loss
also hovers. As a result, we do not see the decrease in probability we originally expected
to see.
Figures 4.5-4.8 below show the financial NPV for the different contract lengths.
For no contract, Figure 4.5, we see the minimum NPV is greater than negative $1 billion,
while the maximum is just shy of positive $1 billion. When there is no contract and
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bidders bid with a 50 percent probability of loss, the NPV range is extremely large. In
Figure 4.8, when contract length is 15 years, the NPV range decreases by more than half.

Figure 4.5 Case 4-1-1: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when Producers
Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 0 years
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Figure 4.6 Case 4-1-2: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when Producers
Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 5 years

Figure 4.7 Case 4-1-3: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when Producers
Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 10 years
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Figure 4.8 Case 4-1-4: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when Producers
Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 15 years

These results were not completely what we expected to find. When the producers
bid with a 50 percent probability of loss, the fuel price is too low to have an overall
impact on the probability of loss for the NPV. As a result, we see the probability of loss
hover around 60 to 70 percent for the economic and financial analysis. These results
differ from Petter and Tyner 2014 because our case is, in general, much less profitable
than their case.

4.2.1.1.2 Producers Bid Fuel Price with 25% Probability of Loss
The second case is a reverse auction with a stochastic fuel price with no trend
where producers bid a breakeven fuel price with 25 percent probability of loss. The
market fuel price is the same as in case 4-1 at $3.03/gallon, while the reverse auction fuel
price is different. The reverse auction fuel price is the breakeven fuel price when
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producers bid with a 25 percent probability of loss when there is no contract. For this
case, the fuel price is $4.45/gallon. This is over 80 cents higher than the fuel breakeven
price for case 4-1.

Table 4.9 Case 4-2 Results: Reverse Auction Results with Stochastic Fuel Price with No
Trend and Producers Bid Breakeven with 25% Probability of Loss
Economic
Financial
Probability
Probability
Length of
Standard
Standard
Contract
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
0 ($194,063,200) $379,790,200
69.9% ($140,094,000) $315,364,000
67.5%
5 ($39,474,480) $299,152,400
55.3% ($11,630,760) $248,301,400
51.9%
10 $65,995,180 $210,488,500
38.5%
$76,014,520 $174,502,400
33.7%
15 $131,481,800 $143,462,600
18.5% $130,433,900 $118,609,400
13.3%

Tables 4.9 reports the economic and financial results for a steady fuel price case
when producers bid with 25 percent probability of loss. The mean NPV increases,
becoming positive when the contract length increases to 10 years, which it did not do
when producers bid with a 50 percent probability of loss. When producers bid with a
higher probability of loss, the mean NPV remained negative for all contract lengths.
Standard deviation decreases as the contract length increases, same as in case 4-1. Lastly,
the probability of loss decreases as the contract length increases. This is what we
expected to happen. When producers are more risk neutral, we see the NPV hovers
around zero. However, when producers are more risk averse, we see that the NPV mean
surpasses zero and becomes positive. As a result, we see a decrease in probability of loss.
For the financial analysis, probability of loss is 67.5 percent with no contract, and
decreases to 13.3 percent with a fifteen year contract. This is over a 50 percent decrease
in probability of loss, which is substantial. Figures 4.9-4.12 below show the financial
NPV for the different contract lengths.
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Figure 4.9 Case 4-2-1: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when Producers
Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 0 years

Figure 4.10 Case 4-2-2: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 5 years
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Figure 4.11 Case 4-2-3: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 10 years

Figure 4.12 Case 4-2-4: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 15 years
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Petter and Tyner 2014 run a stochastic case with three uncertain variables and an
uncertain fuel price, which is one outcome of a reverse auction. Using a breakeven fuel
price of $2.68/gallon, they find a probability of loss for the financial NPV of 13.2 percent.
In their case, $2.68 is the reverse auction price. There is no contract specified for this
case. As a result, it does not depict a real reverse auction. Our reverse auction shows the
impact of contract length when fuel price is stochastically steady. We also take into
account producers bidding with different probabilities of loss. It is unrealistic to believe
that all producers would bid with the same probability of loss. Therefore our results are
more realistic.

4.2.1.2 Stochastic with Drift in Fuel Price
4.2.1.2.1 Producers Bid Breakeven Fuel Price with 50% Probability of Loss
The third case is a reverse auction with an increasing stochastic fuel price where
producers bid a breakeven fuel price with 50 percent probability of loss. The market
price and reverse auction price increase over the plant life. The initial market fuel price
is $3.03/gallon and increases to $3.83/gallon. The initial reverse auction fuel price is
$3.22/gallon and increases to $4.07/gallon.

Table 4.10 Case 5-1 Economic Results: Reverse Auction Results with Stochastic
Increasing Fuel Price and Producers Bid Breakeven with 50% Probability of Loss
Economic
Length of
Contract
0
5
10
15

Min
($1,561,904,000)
($1,169,604,000)
($812,138,300)
($574,310,700)

Max
$1,337,260,000
$1,118,032,000
$787,943,000
$572,174,300

Mean
($90,267,960)
($68,553,700)
($53,033,880)
($42,921,620)

Standard
Deviation
$406,901,900
$323,090,200
$228,625,000
$154,958,800

Probability of
Loss
59.1%
58.3%
59.7%
62.7%
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Table 4.11 Case 5-1 Financial Results: Reverse Auction Results with Stochastic
Increasing Fuel Price and Producers Bid Breakeven with 50% Probability of Loss
Financial
Length of
Contract
0
5
10
15

Min
($1,269,351,000)
($943,350,000)
($646,295,600)
($451,965,700)

Max
$1,133,584,000
$951,404,600
$677,100,900
$496,636,700

Mean
($53,840,140)
($35,795,590)
($22,898,620)
($14,495,340)

Standard
Deviation
$337,908,200
$268,213,700
$189,605,000
$128,206,500

Probability of
Loss
56.6%
55.5%
55.6%
56.0%

Tables 4.10 and 4.11 report the economic and financial analyses for an increasing
stochastic fuel price case when producers bid with 50% probability of loss. Once again
we see the same thing occur as in case 4-1. In both tables the mean NPV increases as the
contract length increases, but stays negative. The standard deviation decreases as the
contract length increases. The probability of loss does not decrease as the contract length
increases. Instead of hovering around 70 percent as in case 4-1, it hovers around 56
percent. Compared to case 4-1, the mean NPV is less negative, increasing to negative
$14 million when contract length is 15 years. Standard deviation is also larger by about
$20 million. The maximum financial NPV’s are also larger. Figures 4.5-4.8 below show
the financial NPV for the different contract lengths. When there is no contract, the
maximum is higher by about $160 million. In Figure 4.13, the maximum NPV is $1.13
billion as opposed to $970 million in case 4-1.
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Figure 4.13 Case 5-1-1: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 0 years

Figure 4.14 Case 5-1-2: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 5 years
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Figure 4.15 Case 5-1-3: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 10 years

Figure 4.16 Case 5-1-4: Financial NPV with Steady Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 50% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 15 years
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Changing the price from steady to increasing has impact on the results. Going
from case 4-1 to case 5-1, Tables 4.8 and 4.11, there are four changes. First, the range in
NPV increases. The minimum remains about the same, but the maximum increases.
This is due to the fuel prices increasing to $3.83/gallon for the market and $4.07 for a
reverse auction. The mean NPV’s decrease and standard deviation increases slightly.
Lastly, the probability of loss decreases. There is over a 7 percent decrease for all
contract lengths. This is a result of fuel price increasing over the plant life.

4.2.1.2.2 Producers Bid Fuel Price with 25% Probability of Loss
The last case is a reverse auction with an increasing stochastic fuel price where
producers bid a breakeven fuel price with 25 percent probability of loss. The market fuel
price is the same as in case 5-1 at $3.03/gallon. The reverse auction fuel price is different
since the producers bid with a lower probability of loss. The reverse auction price is the
breakeven price, while the market fuel price is not. When producers bid with a 25
percent probability of loss when there is no contract, the breakeven fuel price is
$4.05/gallon. The fuel price increases to $5.11/gallon in the last year of the plant life. In
comparison to case 5-1, the breakeven fuel price is $0.83 higher.

Table 4.12 Case 5-2 Results: Reverse Auction Results with Increasing Stochastic Fuel
Price and Producers Bid Breakeven with 25% Probability of Loss
Economic
Length of
Contract
0
5
10
15

Financial

Standard
Probability
Standard
Probability
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
($90,267,960) $406,901,900
59.1% ($53,840,140) $337,908,200
56.6%
$26,707,720 $323,090,200
47.1% $43,366,650 $268,213,700
43.9%
$110,623,700 $228,625,000
32.2% $113,100,800 $189,605,000
28.2%
$165,511,300 $154,958,800
14.0% $158,712,400 $128,206,500
9.9%
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Table 4.12 reports the economic and financial results for an increasing stochastic
fuel price case when producers bid with 25 percent probability of loss. The results are
similar to case 4-2. The mean NPV increases as the contract length increases. However,
instead of becoming positive when the contract length increases to 10 years, it becomes
positive when the contract length is 5 years. Standard deviation decreases by $200
million from no contract to a contract of fifteen years. The probability of loss decreases
as the contract length increases, which is what we expect. It decreases to a lower
probability of loss than case 4-2. When there is no contract, the probability of loss is 56.6
percent. This is the same probability of loss seen in Table 4.5. It decreases to less than
10 percent with a 15 year contract. Figures 4.17-4.20 below show the financial NPV for
the different contract lengths.

Figure 4.17 Case 5-2-1: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 0 years
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Figure 4.18 Case 5-2-2: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 5 years

Figure 4.19 Case 5-2-3: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 10 years
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Figure 4.20 Case 5-2-4: Financial NPV with Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price when
Producers Bid 25% Probability of Loss and Contract Length = 15 years

Petter and Tyner (2014) run a stochastic case for a reverse auction with increasing
fuel price and a forward contract of 45 million gallons per year. The contract length is 18
years, or for project years 5-23. We use shorter contract lengths to evaluate the contracts
which are actually being used today. Our contract quantity is also lower. This is due to
the fact that we use a lower final fuel yield in our analysis. Our annual production is
around 50 million gallons per year instead of 58.6 million gallons per year. Petter and
Tyner (2014) find a probability of loss for the financial NPV of 0.04 percent. For a
contract length of 15 years we find a probability of loss for financial NPV of 9.9 percent.
Our results are more realistic of what is going on in the market. We also have uncertainty
in capital cost which increases the probability of loss.
Overall we see that when producers bid with a 50% probability of loss, the NPV
probability of loss hovers around a percentage above 50%. This is due to the NPV
hovering around zero. When producers bid with a 25% probability of loss, the NPV
probability of loss decreases as the contract length increases. There is also a difference in
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mean NPV’s. With a 50 percent probability of loss for both fuel prices, mean NPV is
negative for all contract lengths. At a 25 percent probability of loss, mean NPV becomes
positive. This is a result of the larger fuel prices bid when producers have a lower
probability of loss. Overall, we also see that when the fuel price is stochastically
increasing versus being steady, there are lower probabilities of loss.

4.2.1.3 Cost to Government
A reverse auction can create a cost to government. As stated previously, the
government can win or lose depending on the market price of oil and aviation biofuels.
The cost to government is calculated as the reverse auction fuel price minus the market
fuel price multiplied by the contract quantity for the contract length. For all other years
that the contract is not in effect, the cost to government is zero. Using this formula, we
find costs to government listed below in Table 4.13 for the four reverse auction cases and
the three different contract lengths.

Table 4.13 Cost to Government for the Four Reverse Auction Cases

Length of
Contract
5
10
15
5
10
15

Case 4-1
$41,772,260
$70,272,610
$87,969,086
9%
16%
20%

Case 4-2
$107,848,380
$181,431,103
$227,120,185
24%
41%
51%

Case 5-1
$15,145,746
$25,972,960
$33,028,923
3%
6%
7%

Case 5-2
$81,606,827
$140,152,041
$178,446,436
18%
31%
40%
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The cost to government varies depending on what probability of loss producers
bid. The cases where producers bid with a 50 percent probability of loss, cases 4-1 and
5-1, have a much lower cost to government. This is due to the fact that when producers
bid with a higher probability of loss, the initial reverse auction fuel price is lower. Case
5-1 has the lowest cost to government. The cost to government ranges from as low as
$15 million in case 5-1 to as high as $227 million in case 4-2. These calculations are
used to analyze a capital subsidy policy in the next section.
We also included what percentage the capital subsidy makes up of capital costs in
Table 4.13. For some of the cases the capital subsidy accounts for a large percentage of
capital costs. Specifically, for case 4-2, when the contract length is 15 years, the capital
subsidy makes up over 50 percent of the capital cost.

4.2.2

Capital Subsidy

Capital subsidy is another policy which can be used to encourage investment in
aviation biofuels. We want to compare the reverse auction to a capital subsidy, so the
costs to government calculated for the various reverse auction cases in Table 4.13 are the
capital subsidies. When there is no contract, there is no cost to government. We report
the results for a 5, 10, and 15 year contract. Capital subsidy is not stochastic for any of
the cases. As a result, it is subtracted from the draw on capital cost. Because the
breakeven fuel price is higher than the market price in the reverse auction cases, the cost
to government can be large.

4.2.2.1 Stochastic without Drift in Fuel Price
4.2.2.1.1 Producers Bid Breakeven Fuel Price with 50% Probability of Loss
The capital subsidy results in Table 4.14 are from using the costs to government
for case 4-1. These results are different than the reverse auction results. The mean NPV
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is negative for all cases and increases as the contract length increases. However, they are
actually more negative than with a reverse auction. For the financial case with a 15 year
contract, the mean NPV is -$65 million with a 58.4 percent probability of loss.
Probability of loss is 63.0 percent for financial with a 5 year contract and decreases to
58.4 percent with a 15 year contract. For the reverse auction case, probability of loss
hovered around 70 percent. For capital subsidy we actually see the probability of loss
decrease slightly as the contract length increases, but the standard deviation remains quite
large.

Table 4.14 Case 6-1 Results: Competitive Capital Subsidy with Stochastically Steady
Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon Using Case 4-1 Costs to Government
Length of
Contract
Mean
5 ($148,780,400)
10 ($117,884,400)
15 ($98,700,300)

Economic
Standard
Deviation
$379,790,200
$379,790,200
$379,790,200

Financial
Probability
Standard
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
65.5% ($104,443,400) $315,364,000
62.4%
($80,119,150) $315,364,000
60.6%
($65,015,720) $315,364,000

Probability
of Loss
63.0%
60.5%
58.4%

4.2.2.1.2 Producers Bid Fuel Price with 25% Probability of Loss
When producers bid with a lower probability of loss the fuel price is higher. As a
result, the cost to government is higher. The costs to government for case 4-2 were used
to find the results reported in Table 4.15. The costs to government were more than
double what they were for case 4-1; therefore, there is an even larger impact. The mean
NPV’s are positive for contract lengths of 10 and 15 years, increasing to $53 million for
the financial analysis when there is a 15 year contract. The probability of loss decreases
to 43.2 percent with a 15 year contract. All probability of losses for case 6-2 are less than
those for case 6-1, but still high. This is due to the fact that the capital subsidies are more
than double what they are for case 6-1. For case 6-2, the capital subsidies range from
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$107 million to $227 million, as opposed to $41 million to $87 million. When producers
bid with a 25 percent probability of loss, there is a larger impact on the NPV probability
of loss, but they remain high and variance is very large.

Table 4.15 Case 6-2 Results: Competitive Capital Subsidy with Stochastically Steady
Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon Using Case 4-2 Costs to Government
Economic
Financial
Probability
Length of
Standard
Probability
Standard
Contract
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
5 ($77,149,950) $379,790,200
58.2% ($48,049,320) $315,364,000
56.4%
10 $2,618,153
$379,790,200
49.7%
$14,751,390 $315,364,000
48.3%
15 $52,147,870 $379,790,200
44.6%
$53,745,700 $315,364,000
43.2%

4.2.2.2 Stochastic with Drift in Fuel Price
4.2.2.2.1 Producers Bid Breakeven Fuel Price with 50% Probability of Loss
This case has the lowest costs to government and therefore the lowest capital
subsidies. When fuel price is stochastically increasing with a 50 percent probability of
loss, the capital subsidies range from $15 million to $33 million. The subsidies for this
case are less than half of what the capital subsidies were when fuel price was
stochastically steady with a 50 percent probability of loss. The results using the costs to
government for case 5-1 are reported in Table 4.16. Due to the capital subsidies being
smaller for this case, the impact is not as large. Financial analysis mean NPV’s are
negative for all contract lengths. Probability of loss decreases as the contract length
decreases. However, it does not decrease at a rapid rate. This rate is similar to the one
seen with a steady fuel price when producers bid with a 50 percent probability of loss in
case 6-1. It decreases to 53.4 percent with a 15 year contract. This is 5 percent lower
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than in case 6-1. Probability of loss decreases only 1.7 percent for the economic analysis
and 1.8 percent for the financial analysis as the contract length increases. The variances
are huge.

Table 4.16 Case 6-3 Results: Competitive Capital Subsidy with Stochastically Increasing
Initial Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon Using Case 5-1 Costs to Government
Length of
Contract
5
10
15

Mean
($73,849,980)
($62,112,620)
($54,463,540)

Economic
Standard
Deviation
$406,901,900
$406,901,900
$406,901,900

Financial
Probability
Probability
Standard
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
57.5%
($40,914,510) $337,908,200
55.2%
56.4%
($31,673,790) $337,908,200
54.0%
55.8%
($25,651,730) $337,908,200
53.4%

The impact of the capital subsidy is driven by the actual amount of the capital
subsidy. Whether the fuel price is steady or increasing also has an impact. Case 4-2 had
the highest capital subsidies. As a result, the impact on probability of loss was greater.
Capital subsidy decreased to 43.2 percent as opposed to 58.4 and 53.4 in cases 6-1 and 63. The mean NPV’s were also greater than in cases 6-1 and 6-3. However, the variance,
which is driven mainly by the stochastic aviation fuel price, remains very high.

4.2.2.2.2 Producers Bid Fuel Price with 25% Probability of Loss
A capital subsidy when fuel price is increasing stochastically with a 25 percent
probability of loss has the largest impact on probability of loss. The impact is largest
because the probability of loss that producers bid is lower as well as the fuel price is
increasing. In stochastic cases 2 and 3, we saw the probability of loss was lower when
fuel prices were increasing stochastically. We see this same trend in the capital subsidy
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results. Table 4.17 shows the results for the three contract lengths. Mean NPV’s are
positive for all contract lengths in the financial analysis. For the economic analysis,
mean NPV’s are positive for contract lengths of 10 and 15 years, but not for 5 years. For
the financial analysis, mean NPV increases to $98 million. When the contract length is 5
years, probability of loss is 48.4 percent for the financial analysis. It decreases to 38.7
percent when the length of contract is increased to 15 years. This case has the lowest
probabilities of loss out of all capital subsidy cases.

Table 4.17 Case 6-4 Results: Competitive Capital Subsidy with Stochastically Increasing
Initial Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon Using Case 5-2 Costs to Government
Economic
Length of
Standard
Probability
Contract
Mean
Deviation
of Loss
Mean
5 ($1,802,161) $406,901,900
50.2%
$15,808,100
10 $61,664,380 $406,901,900
44.0%
$65,774,740
15 $103,177,800 $406,901,900
40.2%
$98,457,890

Financial
Probability
Standard
Deviation
of Loss
$337,908,200
48.4%
$337,908,200
42.4%
$337,908,200
38.7%

Previously, we saw that the financial results were always better than the economic
results. However, this does not hold for this case when the contract length is 15 years. In
this case, the financial benefits do not exceed tax payments. As a result, economic
analysis is better than the financial.
Cost to government is driven by the fuel price. When the fuel price for the
reverse auction is higher than the market price, the government incurs a cost. For all
cases, our reverse auction fuel price exceeded our market fuel price. As a results, there
was a cost to government. As the gap between the reverse auction price and the market
fuel price increases, the cost to government increases. Petter and Tyner 2014 ran a
capital subsidy case in their paper. They had a relatively lower fuel price, but saw similar
results. In our analysis, the high breakeven fuel price did not seem to have a large impact
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on the results for a capital subsidy. As a result, we do not see large decreases in the
probability of loss when a capital subsidy is introduced.

4.2.2.3 Comparison of Reverse Auction to Capital Subsidy
Reverse auction and capital subsidy have different effects. In order to see how
the effects of a reverse auction and capital subsidy differ, we did a comparison of all four
cases. We focused on the financial results for each policy, reporting the mean, standard
deviation, and probability of loss for NPV for contract lengths of 5, 10, and 15 years.
The comparison of capital subsidy and reverse auction policy cases reveals quite a
bit about the way the two policies function. In effect, the capital subsidy shifts the mean
NPV to the right by the amount of the subsidy. However, it has no effect on the variance
of NPV. The reverse auction also shifts the NPV to the right somewhat, but at the same
time has a very large impact on variance, with standard deviation of NPV being much
smaller in all cases. Thus, it is clear that the reverse auction is much more effective in
reducing risk for private sector investors than is the capital subsidy. That is true despite
the fact that probability of a loss is a bit lower for capital subsidy for the 15 year case.
When the variances are as high as we see here, the probability of loss is not as good an
indicator as the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean), and that is lower for
all reverse auction cases.

Table 4.18 Comparison of Reverse Auction and Capital Subsidy Financial Analysis
Results When Fuel Price is Stochastically Steady and Producers Bid with 50%
Probability of Loss
Reverse Auction Financial
Length of
Standard
Contract
Mean
Deviation
5 ($90,334,470) $248,301,400
10 ($56,387,110) $174,502,400
15 ($35,309,930) $118,609,400

CV
(2.7)
(3.1)
(3.4)

Capital Subsidy Financial
Probability
Standard
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
64.4% ($104,443,400) $315,364,000
63.3%
($80,119,150) $315,364,000
63.5%
($65,015,720) $315,364,000

CV
(3.0)
(3.9)
(4.9)

Probability
of Loss
63.0%
60.5%
58.4%
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When producers bid with a 25 percent probability of loss, mean NPV’s increase to
positive values and probability of losses decrease as the contract length increases in Table
4.19. However, the difference between mean NPV values for the policies is larger than in
Table 4.18. For a contract length of 5 years, the difference is over $30 million increasing
to about $80 million when the contract length is 15 years. When contract length is 5
years, the probability of loss for the reverse auction is 51.9 percent. For a capital subsidy,
the probability of loss is 56.4 percent, which is actually higher than the reverse auction by
4.5 percent. Probability of loss decreases to 13.3 percent when the contract length
increases to 15 years for the reverse auction. For a capital subsidy, the probability of loss
only decreases to 43.2 percent when there is a 15 year contract. In all cases except the 5
year case the coefficient of variation is much lower for the reverse auction cases.

Table 4.19 Comparison of Reverse Auction and Capital Subsidy Financial Analysis
Results When Fuel Price is Stochastically Steady and Producers Bid with 25%
Probability of Loss
Reverse Auction Financial
Length of
Standard
Contract
Mean
Deviation
5 ($11,630,760) $248,301,400
10 $76,014,520 $174,502,400
15 $130,433,900 $118,609,400

CV
(21.3)
2.3
0.9

Capital Subsidy Financial
Probability
Standard
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
51.9%
($48,049,320) $315,364,000
33.7%
$14,751,390 $315,364,000
13.3%
$53,745,700 $315,364,000

CV
(6.6)
21.4
5.9

Probability
of Loss
56.4%
48.3%
43.2%

The effects on the results for both policies are both larger than in Table 4.19
because under assumption of producer bids at 25% probability of loss, more of the
variance is reduced and the mean is shifted further to the right. When producers bid with
a lower probability of loss, the reverse auction price increases, which causes mean NPV’s
to surpass zero and probability of loss to decrease. The increased reverse auction price
also increases the costs to government, causing the capital subsidies to be larger.
Although both policies reduce probability of loss, the reverse auction reduced probability
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of loss to a lower value. When contract length is 15 years, the probability of loss for
reverse auction is almost 30 percent lower than for capital subsidy.
In comparison to Table 4.18, the reverse auction and capital subsidy cases are
more similar when fuel price is stochastically increasing. The difference in mean NPV
values is slightly less. For mean NPV, the difference between the policies is $5 million
when contract length is 5 years, increasing to only $11 million when contract length is 15
years. The mean NPV is negative for all contract lengths. Probability of loss is similar
for all cases under both policies, but coefficient of variation is lower for the reverse
auction cases.

Table 4.20 Comparison of Reverse Auction and Capital Subsidy Financial Analysis
Results When Fuel Price is Stochastically Increasing and Producers Bid with 50%
Probability of Loss
Reverse Auction Financial
Capital Subsidy Financial
Length of
Standard
Probability
Standard
Contract
Mean
Deviation
CV
of Loss
Mean
Deviation
CV
5 ($35,795,590) $268,213,700 (7.5)
55.5%
($40,914,510) $337,908,200
(8.3)
10 ($22,898,620) $189,605,000 (8.3)
55.6%
($31,673,790) $337,908,200
(10.7)
15 ($14,495,340) $128,206,500 (8.8)
56.0%
($25,651,730) $337,908,200
(13.2)

Probability
of Loss
55.2%
54.0%
53.4%

When fuel price is stochastically increasing and producers bid with 25 percent
probability of loss, we see the results in Table 4.21. The results are relatively similar to
those in Table 4.19. The impact when fuel price is increasing versus steady is seen in
both policies. The mean NPV’s for a reverse auction are higher than in Table 4.19.
Probability of loss is also lower than in Table 4.19. For the capital subsidy, a change in
the fuel price to increasing, also affects the mean NPV and probability of loss, but capital
subsidy loss probability losses remain relatively constant, while the decline with longer
contracts under reverse auction. All mean NPV’s are higher than those in Table 4.19.
The coefficients of variation are lower in all instances for the reverse auction case.
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Table 4.21 Comparison of Reverse Auction and Capital Subsidy Financial Analysis
Results When Fuel Price is Stochastically Increasing and Producers Bid with 25%
Probability of Loss
Reverse Auction Financial
Length of
Standard
Contract
Mean
Deviation
5 $43,366,650 $268,213,700
10 $113,100,800 $189,605,000
15 $158,712,400 $128,206,500

CV
6.2
1.7
0.8

Capital Subsidy Financial
Probability
of Loss
43.9%
28.2%
9.9%

Mean
$15,808,100
$65,774,740
$98,457,890

Standard
Deviation
$337,908,200
$337,908,200
$337,908,200

CV
21.4
5.1
3.4

Probability
of Loss
48.4%
42.4%
38.7%

Using a reverse auction versus a capital subsidy results in higher mean NPV’s for
all contract lengths. When producers bid with a lower probability of loss, lower
probability of losses are also seen. This trend is seen in Tables 4.18-4.21. When fuel
price is increasing and producers bid with a 25 percent probability of loss, both policies
see decreases in probability of loss as the contract length increases. However, the
probability of loss is lower for a reverse auction. The coefficient of variation is a better
indicator of risk in these cases, and it is always lower for the reverse auction.

4.2.3

Carbon Tax

Carbon tax puts a price on negative externalities. We wanted to see what sort of
impact a carbon tax could have on the probability of loss. We calculated a carbon tax in
dollars per gallon and incorporated it into our spreadsheet. Fossil jet fuel CO2 emissions
reported by the North Carolina Division of Air Quality was 9.57 kg CO2/gallon (North
Carolina Division of Air Quality 2009). We used a 60 percent reduction in CO2
emissions from fossil jet fuel for stover jet fuel CO2 emissions. This is the average of
what was reported in the life-cycle analysis section. The difference is CO2 emissions was
found and then multiplied by the carbon tax of $37/MT CO2 provided by the Interagency
Working Group 2013. This yielded a carbon tax of $0.14/gallon. The carbon tax was
multiplied by annual production and added to fuel sales. We ran a deterministic and a
stochastic case for the carbon tax.
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4.2.3.1 Deterministic
The deterministic results for the carbon tax case are similar to case 1. All the
technical variables are fixed at mean values. The only difference is a carbon tax of
$0.14/gallon is included in fuel sales. We ran the results with the average fuel price of
$3.03/gallon and with the breakeven fuel price. With the carbon tax the effective fuel
price becomes $3.17. Table 4.22 reports the results from using a fuel price of
$3.03/gallon plus the carbon tax.

Table 4.22 Case 7 Results: Deterministic Case with Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon
NPV
IRR (real)
Economic ($150,674,966) 4.8%
Financial ($104,038,710) 4.4%

B/C
0.63
0.54

The results for the deterministic carbon tax case are slightly better than the results
in Table 4.1. The NPV’s for the economic and financial analysis are slightly less
negative. The internal rate of return is also a little better for both analyses. This is due to
the extra revenue generated by the carbon tax. However, using a fuel price of
$3.03/gallon plus the carbon tax, none of the criterion for acceptance of a project for the
three discounted measures of project worth are met. As a results, investors would most
likely not want to invest when fuel price is steady at $3.03/gallon.
We also found the breakeven fuel price for the deterministic case of a carbon tax.
The results for the breakeven are reported below in Table 4.23. They are the exact same
as the results in Table 4.2. The only difference is the breakeven fuel price was
$3.44/gallon. This is exactly fourteen cents less than the breakeven fuel price without a
carbon tax reported in case 1 of $3.58/gallon. At a steady stochastic fuel price of
$3.44/gallon, the plant would be running at neither a loss nor a gain. For the financial,
the IRR is 10% and the B/C is 1.
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Table 4.23 Case 7 Results: Deterministic Case with Breakeven Fuel Price of $3.44/gallon
NPV
IRR (real)
Economic ($25,477,962) 9.2%
Financial
$0
10.0%

B/C
0.94
1.00

4.2.3.2 Stochastic
The stochastic case was run with a fuel price with no trend and one that is
increasing at DOE projections. Comparatively, the results we found were similar to case
2. A carbon tax adds the set amount of $0.14 to the fuel price each year. In the
deterministic results, we saw a decrease in the breakeven fuel price from case 1. Now we
will add uncertainty to that case, as well as one where fuel price is increasing.

4.2.3.2.1 Steady Fuel Price
A stochastic case with a carbon tax gives slightly better results than one without a
carbon tax. The results for a stochastic case where the technical variables are uncertain
and an uncertain fuel price with no trend of $3.03/gallon is used are shown below in
Table 4.24. In comparison to Table 4.3, case 2 results when there is a steady stochastic
fuel price of $3.03/gallon, the mean NPV’s are less negative by about $40 million. The
probability of loss decreased by about 4.5 percent for the financial analysis, from 67.5
percent to 63 percent. There also is almost a 3 percent decrease from the economic to the
financial analysis in Table 4.24. The increase in mean NPV and decrease in probability
of loss are due to the additional revenue gained through the carbon tax. For our plant
with an annual production of about 50 million gallons per year, the carbon tax generates
an additional $7 million annually. Although there is an increase in fuel sales, it does not
seem to have a large impact on the probability of loss. The mean benefit-cost ratios are
both still less than one, although they have increased from those in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.24 Case 7-1 Results: Stochastic Case with Fuel Price with No Trend of
$3.03/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($150,486,800)
11.6%
0.63
($103,882,000)
12.9%
0.54
Standard Deviation $380,165,700
9.2%
0.94
$315,676,100
11.1%
1.42
Probability of Loss
65.7%
63.0%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation

Figure 4.21 Case 7-1: Financial NPV with a Steady Stochastic Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon

The results from the breakeven fuel price with no trend are the same as those in
Table 4.4. The breakeven fuel price with no trend is $3.44/gallon with a carbon tax as
opposed to $3.58/gallon without one. We get the same results, but with a lower
breakeven fuel price in Table 4.25.
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Table 4.25 Case 7-1 Results: Stochastic Case with Breakeven Fuel Price with No Trend
of $3.44/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($25,273,960)
14.0%
0.94
$169,872
16.1%
1.01
Standard Deviation $381,332,200
9.3%
0.95
$316,645,900
11.3%
1.42
Probability of Loss
53.1%
50.2%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation

Figure 4.22 Case 7-1: Financial NPV with a Steady Stochastic Fuel Price of $3.44/gallon

When fuel prices are stochastically increasing, a carbon tax does not have much
effect on the results. As stated previously, the mean NPV’s become less negative, B/C
increases, and probability of loss decreases. However, the carbon tax only influences
them slightly. Therefore, it may not be the most useful policy.
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4.2.3.2.2 Increasing Fuel Price
Similar results are seen for a stochastic case with an increasing fuel price as were
for a stochastic fuel price with no trend. In comparison to Table 4.5, the mean NPV for
the economic and financial analysis increases, becomes less negative, by about $40
million. For the financial analysis, the IRR also increases by about one percent. There is
a 4.2 percent decrease in probability of loss for financial. This is slightly smaller than the
decrease in probability of loss seen for the case were fuel price has no trend. Benefit-cost
ratios increased by about 0.10 from the results in Table 4.5. There is also an increase in
the financial mean B/C by almost 0.40 from Table 4.24, where there is no trend in the
fuel price. Overall, we see that using a fuel price which increases over time, increases
NPV, increases B/C, and decreases probability of loss.

Table 4.26 Case 7-2 Results: Stochastic Case with Increasing Fuel Price of $3.03/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($46,691,560)
13.5%
0.89
($17,628,160)
15.1%
0.93
Standard Deviation $407,289,300
9.3%
1.01
$338,230,200
11.2%
1.52
Probability of Loss
55.0%
52.4%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation
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Figure 4.23 Case 7-2: Financial NPV with an Increasing Stochastic Fuel Price of
$3.03/gallon

The results for the breakeven are the same as those in Table 4.6 for a stochastic
case with an increasing fuel price of $3.22/gallon. With a carbon tax, there is a decrease
in the initial breakeven fuel price from $3.22/gallon to $3.09/gallon. This is a decrease of
$0.13/gallon, which is one cent less than the decrease in the breakeven fuel price from a
stochastic steady fuel price. At a breakeven fuel price of $3.09/gallon, there is a 50.2
percent probability of loss for NPV in Table 4.27. This fuel price is only 6 cents higher
than the average fuel price calculated in fuel price uncertainty section. However,
including the carbon tax, increases the fuel price to $3.23, which is the same price as
what was found without a carbon tax.
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Table 4.27 Case 7-2 Results: Stochastic Case with Increasing Breakeven Fuel Price of
$3.09/gallon
Economic
Financial
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
NPV
IRR (nominal)
B/C
Mean ($25,266,780)
13.9%
0.94
175,837
15.7%
1.01
Standard Deviation $407,485,100
9.3%
1.01
338,393,000
11.2%
1.52
Probability of Loss
52.7%
50.2%
*Note: (1)Nominal Discount Rate Used for NPV was 12.75% (2)IRR calculation had errors in the stochastic calculation

Figure 4.24 Case 7-2: Financial NPV with an Increasing Breakeven Fuel Price of
$3.09/gallon

The carbon tax did not have a large impact on the NPV probability of loss. In
comparison to a reverse auction, the carbon tax did less to reduce the probability of loss
in the NPV, IRR, and B/C. In comparison to cases 1, 2, and 3, the carbon tax had a slight
impact on the NPV, IRR, B/C, and probability of loss. It generates an additional $7
million annually, which helps positively influence the results. Although it has a positive
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impact when fuel price is stochastically steady and increasing, the impact is small.
Clearly, the carbon tax is not large enough to significantly impact the results.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1

Summary of Findings

The aviation biofuel industry at present presents a high risk for private investors.
There is uncertainty prevalent in fuel price, feedstock availability and cost, process yields
and costs, environmental impact, and government policy. Our analysis looks at the
production of aviation biofuel from corn stover using the fast pyrolysis process.
Currently, the risk is high for private investors. One way to reduce this risk is through
government intervention.
Government intervention can be done in the form of a wide range of policies. We
look at three policies in our results: reverse auction, capital subsidy, and carbon tax.
Three additional cases are evaluated: a deterministic case, a stochastic case where fuel
price is steady, and a stochastic case where fuel price is increasing.
For the deterministic case, with a fuel price of $3.03, NPV is negative, IRR is less
than the discount rate, and B/C is less than one. Therefore, a private investor would not
want to invest. The breakeven fuel price calculated was $3.58/gallon.
For the stochastic cases, we look at two fuel prices: (1) fuel price is steady and (2)
fuel price increases at DOE projections. The fuel price is $3.03/gallon, increasing to
$3.83/gallon for the increasing case. Using the fuel price of $3.03/gallon, probability of
loss is lower in the case when fuel price is increasing at DOE projections. When fuel
price is steady, probability of loss for the financial analysis is 67.5 percent. The
probability of loss for when it is increasing is 56.6 percent. The breakeven fuel price is
$3.58/gallon for the steady fuel price case, and $3.22/gallon for the increasing fuel price
case. Breakeven fuel price is the price at which NPV is zero.
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At this price, the plant is running neither at a loss or gain. The probability of loss when
this occurs is 50.2 percent for the financial analysis.
All three government policies reduced risk in investment. However, some
reduced risk more than others. The reverse auction and capital subsidy reduce the
probability of loss more than the carbon tax. For the carbon tax, when fuel price is
stochastically steady, there is a 4.5 percent decrease for the financial compared with case
2. When the fuel price is increasing, there is a 4.2 percent decrease. This is substantially
smaller than the decrease for reverse auction and capital subsidy due to the carbon tax not
being large enough to have a large impact.
Reverse auction and capital subsidy were analyzed using both fuel prices. For
each fuel price two probabilities of loss were used for bids from producers: 50% and 25%.
When producers bid with 25% versus 50% probability of loss, the probability of loss
decreased to a lower value for both fuel prices and both policies. We looked at four
contract lengths: 0, 5, 10, and 15 years. For the reverse auction, the probability of loss
hovered around a percentage when producers bid with a 50 percent probability of loss for
both fuel prices and the contract length increased. When producers bid with 25 percent
probability of loss, the probability of loss for the NPV decreased as the contract length
increased. With a steady price, the probability of loss was 67.5 percent with no contract,
decreasing to 13.3 percent with a 15 year contract. When fuel price was increasing, the
probability of loss with a 15 year contract was even lower at 9.9 percent. For the
comparison of reverse auction, the coefficient of variation may be a better risk indicator
than probability of loss. In our analysis, the coefficient of variation was always lower for
the reverse auction compared with the capital subsidy. The probability of loss shows
much less difference. When price was increasing and producers bid 25 percent
probability of loss, the probability of loss was 43.9 percent with a 5 year contract,
decreasing to 9.9 percent with a 15 year contract under reverse auction. This was
substantially lower than the probability of loss for a capital subsidy at 48.4 percent and
38.7 percent.
The three factors which contributed to lower probabilities of loss were (1) a
stochastic fuel price increasing at DOE projections, (2) when producers bid with a 25
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percent probability of loss, and (3) longer contract lengths. Reverse auction and capital
subsidy both had large impact on probability of loss, but the coefficient of variation for
this analysis is more revealing on risk reduction differences between the two policies.
Coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean. Because the
variances were high, probability of loss is not as good of a measure of risk. The
coefficient of variation was lower for reverse auction than for the capital subsidy in most
cases.
The reverse auction reduced risk the most and at the lowest cost to the
government. In a reverse auction, the purchaser requests bids for a contract to supply
aviation biofuels. The lowest bid wins the contract. Implementation of this policy likely
would be done by the government. The government would put up a contract for a certain
quantity of aviation biofuels to be produced each year for a certain contract length. The
plant builders would place bids on the government’s contract. This bidding process is a
means of effectively creating a competitively based subsidy for aviation biofuels. That is
why it turns out to be more efficient. However, there may be difficulties in securing
adequate competition for new processes such as pyrolysis based aviation biofuels.
Reverse auctions have worked well for known technologies, but they may not function as
well for new and unproven technologies.

5.2

Future Research

Our analysis looks at three policies: reverse auction, capital subsidy, and a carbon
tax. These are not the only policies which could reduce risk for private investors. We
could also conduct analysis on other policies such as a loan guarantee and RIN credits.
In the current political environment, the Renewable Fuel Standard itself also is uncertain.
Future research also could examine the implications of elimination or changes in the RFS.
We look at uncertainty in four technical variables as well as the fuel price. The
analysis could also be done to include system uncertainty. System uncertainty relates to
the possibility that the whole plant may not function as planned (e.g., Kior), or the market
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may take a serious turn downward. By adding the probability of the plant succeeding or
going bankrupt, it would give even more realistic results.
Lastly, we chose to look at aviation biofuels using fast pyrolysis from corn stover.
Other conversion processes as well as feedstocks can be analyzed. However, we chose
fast pyrolysis and corn stover based on our literature review. Our research was also
focused on the United States. It could be expanded to look at other countries.
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Employment Costs
Position
Plant Manager
Plant Engineer
Maintenance Supervisor
Lab Manager
Shift Supervisor
Lab Technician
Maintenance Technician
Shift Operators
Yard Employees
General Manager
Clerks & Secretaries
Total Salaries

Number
1
1
1
1
5
2
8
20
32
0
3

Employment TimeAnnual Salary Annual Expense
100%
$
80,000 $
80,000
92%
$
65,000 $
59,560
100%
$
60,000 $
60,000
100%
$
50,000 $
50,000
92%
$
37,000 $
169,518
92%
$
25,000 $
45,816
92%
$
28,000 $
205,254
92%
$
25,000 $
458,156
92%
$
20,000 $
586,440
100%
$ 100,000 $
92%
$
20,000 $
54,979
74
$ 1,769,723

Figure A 1 Total Salaries Spreadsheet

